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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE 
The Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h i s appeal pursuant t o 
Art , V I I I , § 3 of the Utah C o n s t i t u t i o n , Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 - 2 - 2 , 
and Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
This i s an appeal by P l a i n t i f f , Mountain S t a t e s 
Telephone and Telegraph Co. ("Mountain S t a t e s " ) , from a Dec i s ion 
and Summary Judgment upholding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of Utah Code 
Ann. § 1 7 - 1 9 - 1 5 , en tered October 14, 1988, in favor of the 
Garf i e ld County defendants by the S i x t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court 
in and for G a r f i e l d County. The Complaint a l s o l i s t e d v a r i o u s 
2 
s t a t e o f f i c i a l s as de fendant s . The S t a t e of Utah, however, 
d e c l i n e d t o defend below. See page 9, i n f r a . 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 c o n s t i t u t e s a 
l e g i s l a t i v e l y imposed tax for a loca l purpose or a mandatory 
horizontal revenue sharing measure in v i o l a t i o n of Art i c l e XIII 
§ 5 of the Utah Consti tut ion. 
2. Whether the t r i a l court erred in entering summary 
judgment on Mountain S ta te s ' cons t i tu t iona l claims prior to the 
conclusion of discovery concerning the extent to which Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-19-15 actual ly funds loca l purposes, intrudes on local 
1. The Garfield County defendants include Garfield County; the Garfield 
County Board of County Commissioners, Sherrel Ott, Thomas Hatch and 
Louise Liston; Judy Henrie, Garfield County Treasurer; and Tom Simkins, 
Garfield Countay Assessor. The county defendants were represented by 
counsel l i s t e d on the cover of th i s brief . 
2. The s tate defendants included the Utah State Tax Commission, R.H. 
"Hall" Hansen, Roger 0. Tew, G. Blaine Davis and Joe B. Pacheco; Tom L. 
Allen, Utah State Auditor; and Edward T. Alter, Utah State Treasurer. 
- 1 -
government, results in mandatory revenue sharing, imposes unfair 
and disproportionate burdens on certain classes of taxpayers and 
imposes a local levy that bears no reasonable relationship to the 
costs of assessing and collecting property taxes. 
3, Whether Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15 violates due 
process by permitting a county to tax property located outside 
its boundaries having no substantial nexus to the county. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 
Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for the 
purpose of any county, city, town or other 
municipal corporation, but may, by law, vest in the 
corporate authorities thereof, respectively, the 
power to assess and collect taxes for all purposes 
of such corporation. 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation. 
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides in pertinent part: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridga the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
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Senate Bill 151, 1986 Utah Laws Ch. 109 § 1, codified at 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15, is reproduced as Appendix A to this 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Statement of Facts. In 1986, the Utah State 
Legislature adopted and the Governor signed into law Senate Bill 
No. 151, titled "An Act Relating to Counties; Providing for the 
Collection, Assessment, and Distribution Costs Charged by the 
County, and Providing an Effective Date." The Act, which imposed 
a state-wide levy upon all real property to recoup local property 
tax collection costs, dramatically altered the historic, county-
controlled levy of the property tax. 
Prior to the adoption of the Act, each county funded its 
own costs incurred in the imposition and collection of ad valorem 
property raxes. Each county included the projected amount of 
such costs in its annual budget and set its tax rate at a level 
sufficient to generate revenues to cover all budgeted county 
costs, including assessment and collection costs. The state 
neither participated in the process of establishing a budget for 
county assessment and collection costs nor participated in the 
levying of taxes to fund these costs; these responsibilities were 
left totally to the counties. With the passage of the Act, the 
state assumed control of previously locally performed functions. 
Under the Act, the Board of County Commissioners in each 
county determines the county's cost of "assessment, collection, 
and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal 
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programs." Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(1). That figure, which 
constitutes the county's tax collection budget, is submitted to 
the State Auditor for review. Id. The State Auditor, who is 
required to establish "categories of allowable costs" for tax 
collection budgets throughout the state, then reviews each county 
budget as it is submitted and certifies that it complies "with 
approved categories" of costs. Id. § 17-19-15(2).3 
Following certification and review by the State Auditor, 
all approved county budgets are "transmitted to the State Tax 
Commission for determination of a mandatory state-wide tax rate 
sufficient to meet those expenditures." Id. § 17-19-15(3). The 
tax rate established by the Tax Commission is designed to recoup 
local tax collection costs. The Act expressly provides that the 
state-wide tax rate will be included upon tax notices as "a 
separately listed and identified local levy." Id. (emphasis 
added). The counties have no discretion to alter or reject the 
levy certified to them by the State Tax Commission. Under che 
Act, the counties are left solely with the ministerial task of 
collecting the certified levy. 
Any revenue collected by the counties under the local 
levy in excess of their approved collection and assessment 
budgets does not remain with local taxing authorities. Rather, 
the money is "transmitted to the State Treasurer" without the 
3. The statutory scheme contemplates that the State Auditor has the 
authority to approve or disapprove local tax collection budgets. Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-19-15(2). Prior to the passage of the Act, there was no 
similar state control of local tax collection budgets. 
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counties' consent. Id. § 17-19-15(6). Funds received by the 
State Treasurer are redistributed to counties having tax 
collection budget shortfalls "in accordance with the certified 
[tax collection] budgets." Id. 
The Act promotes inefficient and costly tax collection 
procedures. The collection scheme established by the statute has 
encouraged local taxing authorities to increase their tax 
collection budgets in order to receive maximum benefits from the 
anomalous state-wide — but nevertheless "local" — levy. Every 
conceivable expense that can be denominated a "collection cost" 
has been so labelled in order to obtain the largest possible 
slice of the Section 17-19-15 pie. Tax assessment and collection 
costs in Grand County, for example, have increased nearly three 
fold — from $58,703 in 1985 to $141,305 in 1987. Record at 40. 
Assessment and collection costs have increased nearly five fold 
in Davis County — from $329,695 in 1985 to $1,540,923 in 1987. 
Id. The Act not only encourages inefficient tax collection 
procedures, it also erodes the revenue base of counties with 
efficient tax collection procedures (or low collection costs) by 
forcing them to subsidize more costly jurisdictions. In 1987, 
for example, eight counties were required to turn over 
approximately $2,865,590 in revenue for redistribution to the 
other 21 counties of the state. Compare Record at 19, 21. 
2. Proceedings Below. Pursuant to the Act, Garfield 
County included a separate local levy of $2,692.21 on Mountain 
State's 1987 property tax notice. Record at 9, 45. Mountain 
-5 
States paid the $2,692.21 Local Levy to Garfield County under 
protest- Record at 10, 45. On May 19, 1988, Mountain States 
commenced this action by filing a Complaint in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court in and for Garfield County, State of Utah. Record 
at 1-40. This action is only one of 30 substantially identical 
actions filed by Mountain States and other taxpayers throughout 
the state. 
Mountain States' Complaint For Declaratory Relief and 
Recovery of Taxes Paid Under Protest contains eight claims for 
relief. Record at 1-40. The first three claims assert that the 
Act is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to Mountain 
States because it violates Art. XIII, § 5 of the Utah 
Constitution. Record at 1-12. Mountain States alleges that the 
Act is void under Art. XIII, § 5 because it (1) "constitutes a 
tax imposed by the legislature 'for the purpose of [a] county,' 
in direct contravention of the constitutional proscription" 
(Record at 12, ^ 43, quoting Utah Const. Art. XIII, § 5), (2) 
"transgresses the right to local self government secured oy the 
constitutional provision" (Record at 11, 5 40), and (3) "mandates 
revenue sharing without the consent of affected counties" (Record 
at 12, % 43). 
The remaining counts in the Complaint set forth 
alternative grounds for invalidating the Act as applied to 
Mountain States. The fourth and fifth claims for relief assert 
that the Act violates the due process and equal protection 
provisions of the state and federal constitutions because the 
6 
assessment and collection fee imposed by the statute "bears no 
reasonable relationship" to the costs of assessing and collecting 
the plaintiff's property taxes. Record at 13 %% 48, 52; Utah 
Const. Art. I, §§ 7, 24; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The sixth claim 
asserts that the Act trangresses the equal protection guarantees 
of the state and federal constitutions because it "force[s] 
taxpayers in counties with low local tax collection costs to 
subsidize the local costs of less efficient counties." Record at 
15 f 59; Utah Const. Art. I, § 24; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. The 
seventh claim asserts that the Act constitutes a taking in 
violation of state and federal constitutional provisions because 
the levy it imposes "bear[s] no reasonable relationship to the 
administrative costs incurred in taxing" Mountain States' 
property. Record at 15 5 61; Utah Const. Art. I, § 22; U.S. 
Const. Amend. XIV. The final claim seeks recovery of taxes paid 
under protest. Record at 15, f 63. 
On July 13, 1988, the county defendants answered the 
Complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment before Mountain 
States could conduct any discovery regarding the actual operation 
of the Act, Record at 41-100. On August 4, 1988, Mountain 
States served its first interrogatories and requests for 
admissions and production of documents on the Garfield County 
defendants. Record at 111-112. The discovery requests sought 
information relevant to both the facial and as-applied challenges 
set forth in Mountain States' Complaint, including the items 
actually listed on the county's 1987 assessment and collection 
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budget, the measures actual ly undertaken and expenses actual ly 
incurred in connection with property tax assessment and 
c o l l e c t i o n in 1987, and the s p e c i f i c measures undertaken and 
expenses incurred with respect to the assessment and c o l l e c t i o n 
of Mountain S t a t e s ' property taxes . Mountain States opposed the 
county's jnotion for summary judgment, f i l e d i t s own cross-motion 
for summary judgment on i t s fac ia l chal lenges to the Act, and 
requested the t r i a l court to postpone ruling on the county's 
motion unt i l completion of the requested discovery. Record at 
118-179; Rule 5 6 ( f ) , Utah R. Civ. P. 
The State of Utah did not f i l e any pleading in support 
of the county defendants. Instead, by a l e t t e r dated August 26, 
1988, a copy of which i s attached hereto as Exhibit A, the s t a t e 
informed the t r i a l court that i t considered the counties to be 
the real p a r t i e s - i n - i n t e r e s t and that the State of Utah would not 
a c t i v e l y par t i c ipate in the lawsuit . The l e t t e r , however, 
transmitted an Attorney General's opinion dated February 11, 
1988, which found that the Act was unconst i tut ional , to a s s i s t 
4 the court in i t s consideration of the case . 
On September 1, 1988, a f ter hearing oral arguments on 
Garfield County's motion for summary judgment and Mountain 
4. On February 11, 1988, Attorney General David L. Wilkinson issued a 
formal opinion declaring the Act unconst i tut ional . Formal Opinion No. 
88-01, Feb. U% 1988 (attached as Exhibit B to th i s b r i e f ) . In that 
opinion, the Attorney General concluded that Section 17-19-15 v io la tes 
Art ic le XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution because i t imposes a 
tax upon counties "for the ir own use," subjects county tax co l l ec t ion 
budgets to control by the State Auditor, and requires counties to share 
revenues "without the ir consent." Exhibit B at 11. 
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Sta te s ' cross-motion for part ia l summary judgment, the t r i a l 
court directed counsel for the respect ive part ies to prepare a 
proposed memorandum dec i s ion . Record at 233. On or about 
October 6, 1988, Mountain States and the Garfield County 
defendants each submitted a proposed memorandum decis ion to the 
Court. 
3. Decision of the Court. On October 14, 1988, Judge 
Tibbs entered the proposed Decision and Summary Judgment 
submitted by counsel for the Garfield County defendants, a copy 
of which i s attached hereto as Exhibit C. In i t s dec i s ion , the 
court br i e f l y perused the operation of the Act, and found that 
Garfield County had complied with a l l applicable provis ions . 
Record at 240-241. I t a l so found that the "funding mechanism 
[establ ished by the Act] address[es] a matter of s tate-wide 
concern," i . e . , the "e f f ec t ive , e f f i c i e n t c o l l e c t i o n of ad 
valorem property tax revenues." Record at 242, 1 11. 
In i t s conclusions of law, the court f i r s t addressed 
5 Mountain S t a t e ' s Art i c l e XIII, § 5 chal lenge. The court 
repeated i t s previous finding that equalized and e f f i c i e n t 
5. Prior to conducting i t s Art. XIII, § 5 analys is , the court c i ted and 
analyzed several const i tut ional and statutory provisions without 
specifying how those provisions related to i t s const i tut ional analysis 
in th i s case. The court c i t ed Art. XIII, § 11 of the Utah Constitution 
and found that the provision gives the State Tax Commission power to 
regulate and control county boards of equalization and elected county 
o f f i c i a l s with respect to taxation matters. Record at 243, % 2. The 
Court also fouqd that Art. XIII, § 3 of the Utah Constitution requires 
uniform valuation within the counties and requires the leg i s la ture to 
provide by law a jus t valuation. Record at 243, 5 3. The court also 
noted that Utah Code Ann. T i t l e 59 Chapter 2 provides a procedural 
framework for the property tax assessment and c o l l e c t i o n program. 
Record at 243, 5 4. 
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property tax assessment and collection was a state-wide purpose. 
Record at 243-244, 11 6-8. The court, however, did not state how 
the Act furthers this purpose. Id. The court then concluded 
that, because the Act furthers a state-wide public purpose, it 
does not violate Article XIII, § 5. Record at 244, 1 8. The 
decision is silent with respect to Mountain States' as-applied 
Article XIII, § 5 challenge. 
The Court addressed the revenue sharing aspects of 
Mountain States' Article XIII, § 5 challenge by concluding 
summarily that the revenue sharing aspects of the Act are valid 
under this Court's holdings in Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 540 
P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); and Salt Lake County v. Murray City 
Redevelopment. 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). The Court further held 
that Garfield County had consented to the revenue sharing aspects 
of the Act by adopting its assessment and collection budget. 
Record at 244-45, 11 10, 12. 
With respect to Mountain States' fourth through eighth 
claims for relief, which raise various due process and equal 
protection arguments, the court concluded without discussion 
that, because the local levy imposed by the Act is a ''tax'' and 
not a "fee," each of those causes of action "are inappropriate 
and accordingly must be dismissed." Record at 245-46, 1 13. The 
opinion ends with a catch-all finding that the Act "is 
constitutional in all respects." Record at 246, 1 14. The Court 
ordered that Mountain States' Complaint be dismissed in its 
entirety with prejudice. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Article XIII, § 5 proscribes legislative taxation for 
county purposes to prevent the state from destroying the autonomy 
of local governments. By requiring counties to participate in 
the state-wide sharing of local governmental costs, the Act 
imposes a tax. That tax, moreover, is imposed for a county 
purpose. This Court's decisions plainly establish that the 
payment of salaries of county employees is a local purpose that 
cannot be infringed on by the legislature. City of West Jordan 
v. Utah State Retirement Board, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 40 (Dec. 
30, 1988); Smith v. Carbon County, 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259 
(1936); State v. Standford. 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061 (1901). The 
Act also violates Article XIII, § 5 because it mandates 
horizontal revenue sharing without the consent of affected 
counties. The trial court's finding that the Act furthers a 
"state* purpose, moreover, does not avoid these constitutional 
defects. Indeed, if accepted, the trial court's reasoning 
renders Article XIII, § 5 a dead letter. 
If the Act is not facially invalid, Mountain States' 
Complaint sets forth various constitutional challenges which turn 
upon unresolved factual issues. Mountain States' Article XIII, 
§ 5, due process, equal protection and takings claims turn upon 
such factual questions as whether the local levy actually funds 
local purposes, intrudes on the operation of county governments, 
results in revenue sharing? or imposes a disproportionate and 
unfair burden on certain taxpayers. The summary judgment entered 
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below improperly prevented Mountain States from developing the 
necessary evidence on these genuine issues of material fact. At 
a minimum, therefore, the lower court must be reversed and this 
matter remanded for further proceedings. 
Finally, the Act on its face permits the taxation of 
persons or entities that have no substantial nexus with the 
counties to which the local levy is ultimately paid. Indeed, the 
Act effectively allows counties to collect a levy on property 
outside their boundaries. If this fact alone does not invalidate 
the Act under the state and federal due process clauses, Mountain 
States is at least entitled to an opportunity to show that the 
Act actually results in improper extra-territorial taxation. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment may be granted only where the record 
evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom show that 
(1) ''there is no genuine issue of material fact" and (2) the 
movant is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), 
Utah R. Civ P.; Bowen v. Riverton Citv. 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); 
Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d 17, 492 P.2d 980 (1972); Frederick 
May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962). Neither 
element is satisfied here. If the facial validity of the Act 
under Article XIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution is indeed ripe 
for summary disposition, Mountain States — not the county 
defendants ~ is "entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 
56(c); Utah R. civ P. Moreover, the remaining allegations of the 
Complaint, which set forth substantial claims under the due 
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process, equal protection and property clauses of the state and 
federal constitutions, virtually bristle with unresolved issues 
of material fact- The judgment below, therefore, must be 
reversed. 
I. THE ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE XIII SECTION 5 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION 
Genuine issues of material fact preclude summary 
judgment on many of Mountain States' constitutional claims. 
Section IIB, below. To the extent that the facial validity of 
the Act is ripe for summary disposition, however, Mountain States 
(not the county defendants) is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law because the Act plainly violates the local self-government 
guarantees embodied in the Utah Constitution. 
Article XIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution invests local 
governments with "the power to assess and collect taxes for all 
purposes" of those governments, and specifically enjoins the 
state legislature from "impos[ing] taxes for the purpose of any 
county, city, town or other municipal corporation . . . ." This 
language, incorporated in the original 1896 Constitution, has 
remained unchanged to the present day. The provision is designed 
to decentralize government and maintain political sensitivity by 
insuring that the levy, collection and expenditure of local 
governmental funds is subject to effective oversight and control 
by the local taxpayer. As this Court noted in The Best Foods, 
Inc. v. Christensen, 75 Utah 392, 285 P. 1001, 1003 (1930): 
There can be no doubt but that the framers of our 
state Constitution recognized the rights of the 
people of Utah to local self-government. It was to 
preserve local self-government free from needless 
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legislative interference that the power to levy 
taxes for local purposes was by the state 
Constitution vested exclusively in the proper 
authority of counties, cities, towns, and other 
municipal corporations* The power to collect and 
control the revenues of a municipality is of the 
very essence of local self-government. 
The power to collect and control revenues is the essence 
of local self-government precisely because "an unlimited power to 
tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy." M'Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). Indeed, the authority reserved to 
local governments by Article XIII, § 5 is fundamental to the 
constitutional structure of the state. Loss of local control 
over the levy, collection and expenditure of tax dollars used for 
county purposes debilitates both the accountability and 
efficiency of local government. Article XIII, § 5 prevents that 
result. 
The cons t i tu t ion was doubtless framed and adopted 
with a purpose to protect the loca l s e l f 
governments which had ex i s ted of a p r a c t i c a l l y 
uniform character from the early sett lement of the 
country, s ince which they have remained 
undisturbed, the continued ex i s tence of which i s 
therein assumed, and from which the l i b e r t y of the 
people spring and depend. 
State v. Standford. 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061, 62, (1901). 
The a l l e g a t i o n s of the complaint, which for the purpose 
of analyzing the propriety of the t r i a l court ' s summary judgment 
must be accepted as true , i l l u s t r a t e the e v i l s that ar i s e from 
In the admissible a f f idav i t s submitted in connection with their motion 
for summary judgment and in response to Mountain States ' cross-motion, 
the Garfield County defendants f a i l e d to controvert the a l l egat ions of 
Mountain States ' complaint. Sj&g, Snvder v. Merklev. 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 
1984); Bridge v. Backman. 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960) (unless 
there i s a showing that the disfavored part ies cannot produce evidence 
which would reasonably support a finding in their favor on a material 
or determinative issue of fact , a summary judgment i s erroneous). 
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disregarding Art ic le XIII, § 5. The essent ia l issue in t h i s 
lawsuit i s what autonomy, if any, counties possess. This court 
recently made i t c lear tha t the "r ight of the leg is la ture is to 
es tab l i sh , not to run and operate, the machinery of the local 
government to the disenfranchisement of the people." State v. 
Hutchinson, 524 P.2d 1116, 1121-22 (Utah 1980). However, 
following the passage of the Act, c i t i zens of the counties, 
through the i r own elected o f f i c i a l s , no longer control the 
specif ics of t he i r tax col lect ion budgets; they must now adhere 
to the "categories of allowable costs" set by the s t a t e auditor . 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(2). Moreover, any sense of local 
accountabil i ty or efficiency in es tabl ishing local tax col lect ion 
budgets has been l o s t ; on the contrary, county off icers are 
understandably encouraged to in f l a te tax col lect ion budgets in 
order to obtain the maximum possible subsidy under the Act. In 
turn, the a b i l i t y of local c i t i zens to control local tax 
col lec t ion costs i s measurably diminished because the Act 
comfortably insula tes county o f f i c i a l s from the demands of the 
e l ec to ra t e . The resu l t? Significant increases in tax col lect ion 
costs throughout the state . Page 6, supra. 
7. As noted above and as w i l l be discussed below (Section IIB), the exact 
impact of the Act upon tax c o l l e c t i o n costs has not yet been 
ascertained, because the t r i a l court ruled prior to completion of 
necessary discovery. The exhibi ts attached to the Complaint, however, 
which were prepared largely from information provided by the State 
Auditor's o f f i c e , demonstrates there i s a firm basis for Mountain 
States ' a l l egat ions that the Act unconst i tut ional ly diminishes the 
power of local self-government secured by Art. XIII, § 5. 
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The mere fact that the legislature hoped to develop "an 
efficient means by which to assess, collect and distribute tax 
monies within the State of Utah" does not shield the Act from the 
operation of Article XIII, § 5. Record at 244. 
While the implied restrictions upon the power of 
the legislature with reference to local self-
government are not defined with that particularity 
and incisiveness they could have been, yet they are 
imperative in their character, and when the courts 
find a case presented for consideration which is 
clearly within such provision, it has no 
alternative but to conform to authority. 
State v. Standford, 66 P. at 1062. It is not enough that the 
legislature thought the Act was "efficient" (Record at 244); the 
Act must conform to constitutional requirements: 
The Constitution implies a right of local self 
government to each county, and a right to establish 
a system of county government is expressly 
recognized and enjoined. The power is given to 
create the county government, not to administer to 
such a system when created. The right of the 
Legislature was to provide for and put in action, 
not to run and operate, the machinery of the local 
government to the disenfranchisement of the people. 
When the county government is established separate 
from the state, each is compelled to bear its own 
burdens and not assume those of the other. 
State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116, 1123-24 (Utah 1980) 
(citations omitted) quoting State v. Stanford, 66 P. 1061 at 
1062. 
An analysis of this Court's relevant cases interpreting 
Article XIII, § 5 demonstrates that, in adopting the Act, the 
legislature improperly attempted to bear one of the fundamental 
burdens of the counties: the assessment and collection of 
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property taxes. This attempt is an unconstitutional intrusion 
upon the separate responsibilities of --jtinty governments, 
A. The Utah Constitution Prohibits The Legislature 
From Imposing A Tax For County Purposes 
Article XIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution essentially 
places two limitations upon the power of the legislature (l) it 
may not "impose,llf x ' IK < •'i \^\ ^ he "rp»u: pose of [a] county." 
Decisions of this Court illuminate these inquiries. The Act, 
moreover, violates them both. 
1. Impos i t i.OJ i et sus Permission 
This Court has consistently held that legislative 
enactments which impose taxes, debts or obligations upoi i counties 
for local run poses " 11 J i .n e AI! n:ie Xili t» «i Smith v. Carbon 
County. 90 Utah 560, 63 P.2d 259 (1936); State v. Standford. 66 
P it 108:, By contrast, legislative enactments that merely 
authorize < J unit
 t .JIO ,. e i i me. -: their option -- to either 
incur debts or levy taxes pass constitutional muster, Salt Lake 
County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P. 2d 1 J 3Q n 111ah 197 9); 
Tribe v. Salt Lake Citv Corporation, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); 
Bailev v. Van Dyke, 66 Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925). 
State v. Standford, b6 P. ItibJ „ *:\ . MM'* tiist i.ase in 
which t til;1 Court considered an Article XIII, § 5 assault upon 
state legislation. The challenged legislation required every 
county with 5,000 or more fruit trees to select * --"unty fruit-
tree *.*• Mil i IIP ?».unes n( three practical horticulturists 
submitted to r, : / a member of •.he State Board of Horticulture 
-17-
and to pay, out of county funds, the statutory salary of such 
inspector. Standford invalidated the legislation because: 
Article XIII, § 5 not only limits local or county 
taxation to local county purposes, but it was also 
intended as a limitation upon the power of the 
legislature to grant the right or impose the duty 
of creating a debt or levying a tax to any person 
or body other than the corporate authorities of the 
county. 
66 P. at 1063. Similarly, in Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 
the Court struck down a legislatively imposed probate fee 
schedule, reasoning that since such taxes were imposed by the 
legislature for the use and benefit of counties, the statutory 
scheme violated Article XIII, § 5. 
By contrast, where the state legislature merely 
authorizes county governments to either incur debts or levy taxes 
at their option, the constitutional barrier is not breached. 
Thus, in Bailev v. Van Dyke, 240 P. 454, the Court turned aside a 
challenge to a state statute which permitted, but did not compel, 
counties to enter into contracts with Utah Agricultural College 
for extension services. The Court rejected the Article XIII, § 5 
challenge because "ft]here is no imposition of taxes, direct or 
indirect, by legislative authority upon the county, and no 
interference with local self-government by the county." Id. at 
457. 
The cases relied upon by the district court in its 
summary judgment turn upon the "imposition* versus "permission" 
principle. Record at 244-245 (citing Salt Lake County v. Murray 
Citv Redevelopment. 598 P.2d 1339, and Tribe v. Salt Lake Citv 
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Corporation, 540 P.2d 499)- Murray City Redevelopment and Tribe 
both involved challenges to the Utah Neighborhood Development 
Act, That act authorized local governments to finance 
redevelopment projects in blighted areas with tax revenue bonds.8 
The Court rejected the assertion thai* the ;le."/ elopment act 
violated Article XIII, § 5 because the financing method provided 
by the legislation did not intrude upon the prerogatives of local 
government. On the contrary, 'he statm H r,i engthenerl local self 
government by giving counties, cities and towns alternative 
financing techniques that could be used entirely at their option. 
Murray Citv Redeve 1 opment , 5 9 8 P 2d • 11 1 3 12 ( wSa 1 1: • - . , 1 1 y 
will not lose its vested authority to 'collect taxes for al~ . 
purposes of such corporatior * ; Tribe, 540 P. 2d v -•< "here we 
see i -.-"*- *-^ n 
offended1') Moreover, the Neighborhood Redevelopment Act imposed 
no tax at: all Tribe, 540 P.za at 507 (Crockett, J., specially 
concurring) Rather , r he i:ounl y oont i.nued to impose whatever 
mill levy was necessary to finance its operations. Id. 
2. County Versus State Purposes 
If state legislation imposes i l ax or obi \qn IOI upon 
county government, the next inquiry under Article XIII, § 5 is 
whether that obligation furthers a county or state purpose. 
Althonqb i"ifi p r e c i s e IN-J1 m i l mi if "count " ^ ei sus '•state1"1" 
purposes can be gleaned from the decisions of the Court (Citv of 
8. Such bonds are repaid from the proceeds of ad valorem taxes 
attributable to the increased assessed valuation in the redevelopment 
project area. £e£ Murray Citv Redevelopment. 598 P 2d at 1342 h n.8. 
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West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 37, 
40 (Dec. 30, 1988)), some important guidelines are nevertheless 
discernible. State v. Standford. for example, proceeds upon the 
implicit assumption that hiring and paying the salaries of county 
fruit tree inspectors are "county purposes" that cannot be 
mandated by the state legislature — even though the legislature 
undoubtedly has an interest in fostering agricultural development 
throughout the state. 66 P. at 1063. Smith v. Carbon County 
proceeds upon the similar assumption that probate fees, collected 
and utilized by county court clerks, are used for "county 
purposes." 63 P.2d at 259. These cases, therefore, are merely 
examples of the "general rule" that "the payment of municipal 
debts and general expenses of local government is a corporate 
purpose within the meaning of constitutional limitations upon the 
taxing power of legislatures in regard to county or other 
. . 9 
municipal purposes." 106 A.L.R. 906, 914 (1937). 
By contrast, this Court has found a "state" purpose in 
cases involving an overriding, regulatory interest of the state 
in such areas as the elimination of urban blight (Salt Lake 
County v. Murray City Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339; Tribe v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation. 540 P.2d 499), the regulation of the sale 
of oleomargarine throughout the state (Best Foods, Inc. v. 
Christensen, 285 P, 1001) and the implementation of certain 
9. See also Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-909 ("general county purposes" Include 
"the care, maintenance, and relief of indigent sick and otherwise 
dependent poor" as well as "the construction, improvement, and 
maintenance of county roads" and "all other purposes authorized by 
law"). 
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welfare programs (Denver & R.G.R. Co, v. Grand County, 51 Utah 
294, 170 P. 74 (1917) (construing Dependent Mothers' Act)). 
Importantly, none of these cases : ; , : .ng the actual 
operating costs of county government -i in any circumstance 
— constitute \ ^state* purpose. Cf. State v. Standford, 66 P. 
at 1062-63 (funding the actual costs , t '• »UJ. '•
 r 'government is a 
"county purpose"); Smith v. Carbon County, 63 P.2d 259 (same). 
Ln it'.i mo^t rp^ent treatment of the '"state" versus 
"municipal" purpose issue, the Court recognized thai the opinions 
cited above have provided "relatively little , . , analytical 
framework for deteriii ni ng how to characterize a given area of 
activity." West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board, 98 Utah 
10 
Adv. Rep. a t 40 . The Court, t h e r e f o r e , r e j e c t e d "the search 
for any hard in i J ist . - i t e q o r i z a t i o n of s p e c i f i c f u n c t i o n s as 
' m u n i c i p a l ' o r ' s t a t e , ' " and i n s t e a d focused upon the " f a c t o r s 
t h a t a r e p e r t i n e n t to t h e s p e c i f i c l e g i s l a t i o n at i s s u e . " Id . 
The Court s t a t e d I Ii ,-J 1", t h e s e f a r • t o r s : 
. . . i n c l u d e , but are not l i m i t e d t o , t h e r e l a t i v e 
a b i l i t i e s of t h e s t a t e and munic ipal governments t o 
perform t h e f u n c t i o n , t h e degree t o which the 
10. The Pla int i f f in West Jordan challenged the const i tu t ional i ty of a 
s ta tu te that required municipalities to ei ther belong to the State 
Retirement System or opt to provide no retirement benefits to their 
employees. 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 38-39. One of the c i t y ' s 
const i tut ional challenges was based on Art. VI, § 28 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides that "The Legislature shall not delegate 
to any special commission, private corporation or association, any 
power to perform municipal functions." The c i ty argued that the 
retirement s ta tu tes delegated the municipal function of providing 
retirement benefits for municipal employees to a special commission -
the State Board of Retirement. Id. at 39. This Court assumed for 
purposes of i t s analysis that the board was a special commission and 
therefore conducted a detai led analysis of the meaning of "municipal 
function." 
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performance of the function affects the interests 
of those beyond the boundaries of the municipality, 
and the extent to which the legislation under 
attack will intrude upon the ability of the people 
within the municipality to control through their 
elected officials the substantive policies that 
affect them uniquely. 
Id. The Court emphasized that these factors must be applied "'to 
prevent interference with local self-government. ,/r Id. (quoting 
Municipal Building Authority v. Lowder. 711 P.2d 273, 281-82 
(Utah 1985)). 
3. The Act Impermissibly Imposes A Tax For County 
Purposes 
The authorities set out above demonstrate the patent 
unconstitutionality of the Act. The legislation imposes a 
defined, unalterable tax upon local property owners to fund the 
costs of operating county governments. Counties must submit 
proposed tax collection budgets to the state and must collect the 
"local levy" certified to them by the state. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-19-15(1), (3). Therefore, the first level of analysis under 
Article XIII, § 5 is satisfied. The proceeds raised by the Act, 
furthermore, are undoubtedly used to fund a "county" rather than 
a "state" purpose. Indeed, whether one uses the rather 
categorical approach of the Court's older cases or the pragmatic, 
multi-factor analysis of West Jordan, it is plain that the Act 
imposes a tax for a county purpose. 
Although Mountain States has not been afforded the 
opportunity to donduct discovery as to the specific uses to which 
the proceeds of the Act are put, it is apparent from the face of 
the legislation that all proceeds must be used to pay the local 
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(governmental operating costs reflected on county tax collection 
budgets. Utah Code Ann § 17-19-15(1). Indeed, the Act itself 
was legislatively denominated as "An Act Relating To Counties'' 
(S . Bill No. 151) and the t :a:x 1 evy i 1: establ i shes i s 1 abelled a 
"local levy." Id. § 17-19-15(3). Therefore, it would appear 
that all proceeds of the Act are used to pay the salaries and 
expenses n t • cum I: ',„ officials, some of wh i ch perf or m duties 
relating to the assessment, collection and disposition of 
property taxes, and some of which do not. It is difficult to 
conieeuM 1 In *' ui*"' pa IIUMIT nr s a l a r i e s IIIMI • wf 
operations that are constitutionally vested . \ne ounties to 
the exclusion of the state can Ke described ::y any stretch of 
t h e I in a g i n a t i o i i a s <i " s t a 1 ' - • :: o s t s o f 
e lected county o f f i c i a l s ' performance *. \: e i r cons t i tu t iona l 
dut ies i s c l ear ly a fundamental "purpose of [a] county" within 
t h e i n t e n d m e n t i. f Art" i i"Ie >" I I I *j ^ S m i t h \ . Ca rbon C o u n t y , 63 
?.2d at 262 ( l e g i s l a t u r e cannot impose a schedule of fees for 
county probate c l erks ; such taxes must "not be levied by the 
Legii- , .* ., - * i.ef i t of a ::ci: -i n it> ") ; S t a t e v. 
Standford, 66 E despite the s t a t e in teres t in 
11. Mountain States has obtained a copy of Garfield County's 1987 
assessment and c o l l e c t i o n budget from the State Auditor's o f f i ce . A 
copy of that'budget i s attached hereto as Exhibit D, That budget 
demonstrates that the vast majority of the revenue generated by the 
local levy i s , in fact , used to pay for the sa lar ies and benefits of 
county employees, including the county commissioners, assessor, 
treasurer, auditor, recorder, attorney and a l l of their s taf f members; 
county maintenance employees and even county personnel employees. 
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agriculture, fruit tree inspectors paid by a county are engaged 
12 in a "county purpose"). 
The above re su l t i s equally c lear under the mult i -
factored approach of West Jordan, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. 
F i r s t , the r e l a t i v e a b i l i t i e s of the s t a t e and county governments 
to administer the assessment and c o l l e c t i o n of property taxes 
m i l i t a t e toward the conclusion that the the Act 's "local levy" i s 
imposed for a county purpose. The valuation of property and 
c o l l e c t i o n of property taxes on purely loca l propert ies are 
functions that individual counties are in a much bet ter pos i t ion 
to perform than the s t a t e because of t h e i r proximity to the taxed 
property and d irec t control over the o f f i c i a l s who perform the 
valuat ion and c o l l e c t i o n funct ions. The statutory a l l o c a t i o n of 
valuation r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s between the State Tax Commission 
(which e s tab l i shes values for property that operates as a unit 
across county l i n e s , property of public u t i l i t i e s and mining 
12. The financing scheme provided by the Act i s fundamentally d i f ferent 
from that approved by th is Court in Tribe. 540 P.2d 499, and Murray 
City Redevelopment. 598 P.2d 1339. The Act es tabl i shes a l e g i s l a t i v e l y 
imposed mil l levy to pay the sa lar i e s and expenses of e lec ted county 
o f f i c i a l s . The financing scheme in Tribe and Murray City 
Redevelopment, by contrast , involved the mere diversion of incremental 
tax revenues to re t i re revenue bonds issued by redevelopment agencies. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-19-3 and 11-15-4. The creation and operation 
of those redevelopment agencies, moreover, were subject to loca l 
control . Most importantly, however, the temporary diversion of tax 
revenues did not impinge upon nor deprive the county of i t s "vested 
authority to { c o l l e c t taxes for a l l purposes of such corporation.'" 
Murray C i t r Redevelopment. 598 P.2d at 1342. The redevelopment act 
simply required that taxes l ev ied against redeveloped property "remain 
s t a t i c for that period of time during which the bonds of redevelopment 
are being re t i red ." Id. The Act, by contrast , s t r ips Garfield County 
of i t s a b i l i t y to independently se t i t s mil l levy and administer i t s 
tax c o l l e c t i o n budget without s ta te oversight. 
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p r o p e r t i e s and coun t i e s which a s se s s a l l o the r p roper ty in t h e i r 
boundaries) recognizee the c o u n t i e s ' s upe r io r a b i l i t y t o perform 
v a l u a t i o n and c o l l e c t i o n funct ions with r e spec t to pi i re ly l oca l 
p r o p e r t i e s . Utah Cocu Ann. §§ 59-2-201, - 3 0 1 ; in f ra p . 45-46 n. 
27. The Act, i t s e l f , ; t u a l l y concedes t h i s po in t by r equ i r i ng 
the coun t i e s t o p repare the budgets and genera te the revenues 
necessary for t he l e g i s l a t i v e scheme t o func t ion . Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-19-15(1) t h ru (3 ) . 
The second prong of the West Jordan ba lanc ing t e s t i s 
' ' the degree t o which the performance of t he funct ion a f f e c t s the 
i n t e r e s t s of those beyond ffie boundaries of the m u n i c i p a l i t y . " 
98 Utah Ach< Rep, at 40. This f ac to r a l s o i n d i c a t e s tha t t he 
valuat ion of proper ty and c o l l e c t i o n of p roper ty t axes i s a 
"county" r a t h e r than a *stti*'•>" ni.rr.rvie, The assessment and 
c o l l e c t i o n funct ions funded by ie l o c a l levy are
 : . t:. i iied 
excius iveJy within the boundaries of each county." Once 
c o l l e c t e d , moreover, proper ty !ax rp^nwps c o l l e c t e d by each 
county a re used to f inance t h a t c o u n t y ' s own government (unless 
t ha t .•;ounty "' ro1 u n t a r i l y dec ides t o share i t s r evenues ) . If 
t axpayers a re d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e i r c i i n t / s e f f i c i ency — or 
lack of - in t h e c o l l e c t i o n procedure and t h e r e s u l t uv.j 
impact T ^ervj_cesf they have d i r e c t p o l i t i c a l input t o 
13. Each county .assessor, for example, assesses only the property located 
within that county. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-301. Moreover, a county 
commission s i t t i n g as a county board of equalization has no authority 
to hold equalization hearings for property located outside the county. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1001. Each county t reasurer ' s office has the 
responsibi l i ty of col lect ing the property tax due from the owners of 
property located only within his or her county. 
- 2 5 -
effectuate change• As a result, the efficiency of any given 
county in assessing and collecting taxes cannot be said to 
vitally affect "the interests of those beyond the boundaries of 
the [county]." West Jordan, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 40. Indeed, 
the opposite conclusion wouid disenfranchise local voters and 
impermissibly conflict with this Court's declaration in Best 
Foods Inc. v. Christensen. 285 P. at 1003, that "[t]he power to 
collect and control the revenues of a municipality is the very 
essence of local self-government." 
The final factor ur.aer West Jordan is "the critical 
question of the challenged legislation's degree of intrusiveness 
on local officials' control of policies that uniquely affect 
their citizenry." 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41. The Act plainly 
constitutes an impermissible intrusion upon local officials' 
control of policies uniquely affecting their electorate. The Act 
strips citizens and taxpayers in any given county of the power to 
determine how much they will pay in property taxes. Under the 
Act, the local levy rate, and thus the amount of property taxes 
collected by each county, depends on the aggregate budgets of all 
29 counties. Thus, a taxpayer's actual tax bill is established 
by 28 county commissions over which the taxpayer has absolutely 
14 
no pol i t i ca l control. 
The Act similarly divests counties and their electorates 
of po l i t i ca l control over the disposition of tax funds. Monies 
14. One of the most egregious examples of th i s disenfranchisement occurs in 
Millard County, where the 1987 budgeted cost of tax assessment and 
c o l l e c t i o n was $485,000, but the Act required i t to c o l l e c t $1,294,375. 
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collected in excess c f approve* :i budgets ire i K: t used to cover 
local costs or enhance county services, but instead are used to 
pay the salaries of county treasurers, recorders, assessors, 
attorneys, cler/ fficials in counties where the 
"local levy" is insufficient to cover local assessment and 
15 
collection costs. The Act. in short, does not leave the 
•cunt.ies a n J • he i t r ;nst; J uenh I a x p a > M I .1 '*" W ith c o m p l e t e a u t o m o n y " 
regarding the assessment, collection and disposition of local 
taxes as required by third prong of West Jordan. 98 Utah 
Adv Rep. Ra .t i ntrudes i i 1 • i """si gnificant way in 
the day-to-day functioning of local government." Id. As a 
result, thf undoubtedly offends the third West Jordan factor. 
W* . , - « » ral rule" 
demonstrated by , r- •-.* cases tha- ^:he payment of , general 
expenses -* government -• * orporate purpose within the 
mean i.nq . * , jwer of 
legislatures ,- regard to count' purposes* L.R. at 
914; Smith v. Carbon County, * i '62; State v. 
Standford. -* West Jordan 
analysis, the outcome -J apparent: the -* - imposes * *ax "for the 
purpose of [a] county * • r* Const. 
proceed 1 .- „ * * i 
"general expenses of loca l government 106 A.: R - ** The 
e l ec torate of each county, furthermore, ^ *n the bes t pos i t ion 
15. The taxpayers of Millard County, therefore, have no p o l i t i c a l control 
over the d i spos i t ion of $800,000 of the tax dol lars they generate. 
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to control the purse strings of that county. The property tax 
assessment and collection process, moreover, is county specific 
because a breakdown of that function in one county has no effect 
on neighboring counties. Finally, the Act totally divests voters 
of any control over the process of setting their own tax rates. 
Therefore, if this Court finds there are no outstanding factual 
issues precluding entry of summary judgment, it must reverse the 
trial court and declare the Act unconstitutional. 
B. The Lower Court's Reliance Upon Various Alleged 
"State" Purposes Does Not Validate The Act 
The district court did not specifically address the 
analysis set out above. Instead, the court found that because 
the "Act and the tax levy imposed thereunder are in furtherance 
of [a] state-wide public purpose" the Act "does not violate 
Article 13, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah." 
Record at 244, % 8. The court noted that the state-wide purpose 
served by the Act included "legislative concerns regarding 
equality and uniformity of assessment." I&. at % 7 This 
reasoning, however, is at odds with the Court's recent decision 
in West Jordan v. Utah State Retirement Board. 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 
at 40, in which this Court proscribed excessive intrusion on 
"local officials' control of policies that uniquely affect their 
citizenry," and plainly falters as a guide to constitutional 
interpretation. Indeed, such logic if approved or adopted by 
this Court would instantly render Article XIII, § 5 a dead letter 
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because t h e r e would never be any wl caL purpose* immune from 
l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e and o v e r s i g h t . 
Both tl le s t a t e and the coun t ies a re r e spons ib le for the 
genera l welfare of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e enii ,»ens. Since the count ies 
a re p o l i t i c a l subd iv i s ions of the s t a t e and have j u r i s d i c t i o n 
over geographical reqions t o t a l l y wi th in the boundaries of the 
s t a t e , any person or problem of " i n t e r e s t "  to local j u r i s d i c t i o n s 
i s a l so of " i n t e r e s t " - " ;:e. See S t a t e v. Standford. 66 
P. 1061. T ^er c o u r t ' s a n a l y s i s , t h e r e f o r e , the s t a t e 
can claim a l e g i t i m a t e " i n t e r e s t " in IM «U I ,' every funct ion of 
county government. Thus, If a l e g i t i m a t e s t a t e " i n t e r e s t " i s 
s u f f i c i e i iv mil app l ica t ion of A r t i c l e XII I , § 5, t h a t 
p rov i s ion has been rendered meaningless 
By i t s very ex i s t ence in the C o n s t i t u t i o n , however, 
t h e r e must conduct t h a t i s p roh ib i t ed by A r t i c l e 
XI I I , § 5. Because the performance by e lec ted county o f f i c i a l s 
of t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d u t i e s to impose t axes for t h e i r own 
purposes coi'ist,itut e:",. t hk*\ very essence of county government 
(Sect ion I , s u p r a ) . such conduct must fal ] wi th i n A r t i c] e XIII , 
§ 5 . I f the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o s c r i p t i o n i s to mean anything, i t 
16. The Trial Court's reliance on uniformity and equalization of property 
assessments as a justifying "state purpose," moreover, is illogical on 
i ts own terms. The t r ia l court's rationale assumes that if all 
counties have sufficient resources to conduct their assessment roles, 
equalization and uniformity will result. The Act, however, does not 
require the counties to expend the revenues from the local levy in any 
manner that*insures uniformity and equalization. Mere expenditure of 
money does not guaranty equalization and uniformity. Indeed although 
the levy is imposed and the tax is collected under color of state 
authority, the state abdicates any responsibility to determine how the 
funds are spent beyond certifying "approved categories of costs." 
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must prohibit the legislative imposition of a tax to fund the 
salaries and expenses of county officials involved in the 
assessment, collection and disposition of local property taxes. 
Perhaps sensing the tenuous nature of its "state 
interest" holding, the district court suggests that the Act is 
indistinguishable from numerous other legislative enactments 
providing state oversight of local taxation. Record at 243.17 
This rationale likewise does not withstand scrutiny. Except for 
the Act, not a single one of the oversight provisions mentioned 
by the lower court abrogates the exclusive constitutional right 
of local governments to impose ^axes for their own purposes. 
In State v. Eldredae. 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337, 338 
(1904), this Court discussed in some detail the relationship 
between the respective competencies of local and state taxing 
authorities. The precise question before the Court was whether 
the State Board of Equalization (now the State Tax Commission) 
could constitutionally assess property situated wholly within one 
county. The Court noted that Article XIII, § 11 of the Utah 
Constitution established both local and state taxing authorities, 
"each to act and discharge duties, independent of the other. 
Each was designed to perform special and important functions." 
76 P. at 338. The Court further noted that neither state nor 
local taxing authorities had the power to perform acts 
17. The court's decision implies that the Act does not raise serious 
constitutional concerns because, under various other statutes, "the 
Legislature and the Utah State Tax Commission have, to a large degree, 
issumed control of the local administration of the property tax 
system." Id. at 6. 
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encroaching upon the domain of the other. The Court concluded 
that, because one of the essential powers reserved to local 
governments is the right to impose taxes for local purposes, the 
Utah Constitution does not allow the state to assess "property 
the situs and operation of which is who!,]y within one county," 
Id. at 340. The Court's reasoning behind this conclusion is 
inst:r11ct i ve here (id.) : 
If the construction which the relator seeks to 
place upon that language of the Constitution were 
to be adopted, then there would seem to be no 
reason why the State [tax commission], by 
legislative enactment, might not be authorized to 
also levy and collect the taxes upon property 
situate wholly within one county, or to perform any 
other local duties which the legislature might see 
fit to impose upon the board. As will be noticed, 
this would clearly be in violation of section 5, 
art. 13, which directs the Legislature to vest in 
the corporate authorities the power to assess and 
collect taxes for local purposes. 
Eldredge, therefore, makes clear that *- whatever the 
isponsi bi 1 i ties ::)f" s I:ate tax::i i ig
 authorities — state 
power over the taxing function of Local governments stops far 
short of the actual levy and collection of a tax. The Act, by 
imj~ • - constitutionally 
intrudes upon the role of 1 oca] government. 
C. The Act Mandates Impermissible Horizontal Revenue 
Sharing 
One "county purpose" that has always been considered to 
\)H ur if.eeteil li mi Ipqislat i t e i rtf (=»? f n r e " * • *'-"*'•<*** h o r i z o n t a l 
revenue sharing State v. Standford. 66 v nder the 
constitution the state has no power to make a disposition of 
'jount y t uridyl, liiinid i equ i re lb*J .ippr ipr i ateci for o t h e r and 
- Jl 
d i f f e r e n t purposes than t h o s e for which by a u t h o r i t y of the 
18 
county they were c o l l e c t e d " ) . In i t s cross-motion for summary 
judgment, Mountain States asserted that the Act v i o l a t e s Art, 
XIII, Section 5 because the revenue red i s tr ibut ion features of 
the Act cons t i tu te mandatory horizontal revenue sharing. This 
claim r a i s e s two principal i s s u e s : (1) whether the property tax 
red is tr ibut ion mandated by the Act cons t i tu te s impermissible 
horizontal revenue sharing, and (2) whether the counties have 
consented to the revenue sharing features of the Act. The t r i a l 
court erred in i t s treatment of both i s s u e s . 
Although the d i s t r i c t court did not e x p l i c i t l y analyze 
the question, the Act unquestionably r e s u l t s in the 
red i s tr ibut ion of funds between count ies . As the Garfield County 
defendants conceded below, and as i s c lear from the face of the 
18. In fact , prior to 1983, i t was thought that Art. XIII, § 5 prohibited 
even voluntary revenue sharing. Consequently Art. XIII, § 5 was 
amended in 1983 to include a second sentence, which expressly permits 
voluntary revenue sharing by s ta t ing as fol lows: "Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary contained in th i s cons t i tu t ion , p o l i t i c a l 
subdivisions may share their tax and other revenues with other 
p o l i t i c a l subdivisions as provided by s ta tute ." This amendment, 
however, does not authorize compelled l e g i s l a t i v e horizontal revenue 
sharing, but rather provides that local jur i sd i c t i ons "mav share"' ~heir 
revenues. As the "Impartial Analysis" prepared by the Office of 
Leg i s la t ive Research and General Counsel for the 1982 voter information 
pamphlet explains (emphasis added): 
Past l ega l opinions indicate that Art ic le XIII, 
Section 5 prevents the local governments from 
sharing their tax revenues with each other. The 
proposed rev is ion would a l t er th i s prohibit ion and 
allow loca l governments at their option to share 
tax revenues. 
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Act, revenues generated by taxes imposed on property in one 
county aire diverted to the State Treasurer for redistribution to 
other counties • * Lode Ann. § 17-19-15(6). 
This feature of the Act clearly constitutes horizontal revenue 
sha i: i ng. 
The trial court avoided - necessary implication of the 
preceding fact, however, by concluding - without explanation — 
that *t\o thF pxtent said statutory program results in revenue 
sharing . . . lint lediati ibut jun is i' 1 e.i r 1<, consistent with 
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, and in particul ar "Tribe v. 
Salt Lake City Corp.., 540 P• 2d 499 (Utah 1975), and Salt Lake 
County v. Murray Citv Redevelopment, V9B P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979)." 
As discussed above (at 2? - ~"^K both Tribe and Murray City 
invnj i-ei'i challenges * + * Neighborhood Development Act. 
Unlike the intra-count} * - ster's tn those cases, the 
horizontal revenue sharing between counties mandate . . ;t 
ft MitgLessH1.-. i he core concerns of Article XIII, § 5. The lower 
court's reliance upon Tribe Murray City Redevelopment, 
therefore, is seriously misplaced. 
Tribe Murray Citv can be distinguished from this 
case on numerous grounds - - tax funds 
transferred from • counties -. , .. -. redevelopme ,«jenc i »•:•, in 
Tribe .iniricl ilMl.l . . " ^? - *"r the affected counties. Rather, 
those funds remained . -- ana, *~ fostering 
development, ultimately benefitted the county bv ; casing the 
tax base Mujj^
 fc. , u?o *. *~ a_ _i ^  n.8. The Act's scheme, 
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on the other hand, diverts money from certain counties for uses 
that do not benefit those counties in any way. Indeed, the 
revenues diverted under the Act are given to other counties to 
fund local operations of those other counties. 
More importantly, the legislation involved in Tribe and 
Murray Citv left the affected counties "with complete autonomy" 
in setting their tax levy rates. See West Jordan v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41. The temporary 
diversion of increased tax revenues flowing from the 
redevelopment projects that resulted in those increased revenues 
in the first place simply did not deprive the counties of their 
"vested authority to 'collect taxes for all purposes of such 
corporation.'" Murray Citv, 598 P.2d at 1342. See also Tribe 
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 540 P.2d at 505 (Crockett, J., specially 
concurring) (a value increment financing scheme is constitutional 
because it does not divest the county of the right to set its own 
mill levy rate). The Act's scheme, on the other hand, vests 
control of any given county's budget process — and thu^ the 
establishment of any county's mill levy rate — in 28 other 
counties. Absent county consent, therefore, for the reasons 
discussed at length above (Section IA), the Act violates Article 
XIII, § 5's proscription on horizontal revenue sharing. 
The trial court concluded that Garfield County did in 
fact consent to the revenue sharing aspects of the Act because 
"by proposing and adopting a budget pursuant to [the Act, the 
county] has, to the extent they have proceeded to adopt said 
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budget , v o l u n t a r i l y agreed t o any revenue shar ing t h a t might take 
p l a c e as a r e s u l t of the implementation of s a i d s t a t u t e . " Record 
a t 243, 1 12, Such reasoning i s t a u t o l o g i c a l . The Act i t s e l f 
mandates t h a t "the board of county commissioners of each county 
annual ly s h a l l s e p a r a t e l y budget for a l l c o s t s incurred in the 
assessment , c o l l e c t i o n and d i s t r i b u t i o n of property t a x e s and 
r e l a t e d a p p r a i s a l programs and submit t h o s e budgets t o the s t a t e 
aud i tor for r e v i e w , " Utah Code Ann. § 17-19-15(1 ) (emphasis 
added) . The Act s imply does not g i v e the c o u n t i e s the o p t i o n to 
r e f r a i n from submit t ing a budget and thereby p a r t i c i p a t i n g in the 
19 program. A l l 29 c o u n t i e s have, in f a c t , complied with t h e 
mandate of the Act by submi t t ing t h e i r assessment and c o l l e c t i o n 
budge t s . Therefore , the lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t a county 
c o n s e n t s t o h o r i z o n t a l revenue shar ing by complying wi th t h e 
20 A c t ' s mandatory p r o v i s i o n s i s absurd. 
19. There i s no optional provision in the Act, for example, that would 
permit a newly e lected county commission in Garfield County to decide 
that, instead of assess ing the prescribed "local levy," i t would 
instead set i t s own mil l levy and retain the resul t ing revenues to 
improve i t s tax assessment, c o l l e c t i o n and dis tr ibut ion system under 
i t s own program. 
20. The only other submission made by the county defendants in support of 
their claim of consent was that the Utah Association of Counties and 
the Utah Association of County Commissioners and County Councils 
supported passage of the Act. This fact , even i f establ ished by 
competent evidence, cannot es tab l i sh "consent" within the intendment of 
Art ic le XIII, § 5. Section 5 vests control of county spending in local 
o f f i c i a l s who are subject to local e lectorate oversight. Best Foods. 
Inc. v. Christensen. 285 P. at 1003. The s tate const i tut ion thus 
contemplates ohat local o f f i c i a l s w i l l vote on measures that affect 
public spending at public meetings where they w i l l receive the voter 's 
input and be subject to the voters ' scrutiny. Allowing local o f f i c i a l s 
to v icar ious ly "consent" to matters affect ing local budgets would 
insulate those o f f i c i a l s from the e lectorate and thereby circumvent the 
p o l i t i c a l protections b u i l t into the s tate const i tut ion . 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The Act violates Article XIII, § 5 by imposing mandatory 
horizontal revenue sharing for county purposes. The 
redistribution of funds required by the Act constitutes revenue 
sharing. That revenue sharing, moreover, possesses none of the 
unique aspects of the valuation increment financing scheme upheld 
in Tribe and Murray City. The Act, furthermore, is mandatory and 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
The importance of political participation is highlighted by the 
Truth in Taxation Act, 1985 Utah Laws Ch. 114, codified at Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-2-918 thru 924, which imposes stringent preconditions on ad 
valorem tax increases. The Truth in Taxation Act requires counties to 
publish detailed notices of proposed increases and to mail to each 
taxpayer a notice of tax increase that contains very specific 
information concerning the nature of proposed tax increases bv each 
taxing district and their impact on that taxpayer and the date, time 
and place of a public hearing on the proposed tax hikes. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 59-2-918, 919. The purpose of the Truth in Taxation Act was to 
increase political participation in the budgeting and taxation process. 
The Act, however, circumvents the purpose of the Truth in Taxation Act 
by creating an assessment and collection levy not subject to the public 
participation requirements of the Trust in Taxation Act. In order to 
provide the public with the same participation rights they have for 
normal ad valorem tax increases under the Truth in Taxation Act, the 
assessment and collection levy setting would require every county 
intending to increase its assessment and collection levy to send a 
Truth in Taxation Notice to every taxpayer in the state. This would be 
necessary because virtually every county is either importing or 
exporting money to another county under the Act. This result 
highlights the manner in which the county defendants' alleged means of 
consent, if accepted by this court, would insulate the program 
established by the Act from the political process. 
Moreover, even if Garfield County's membership in the above 
associations could be construed as consent to the revenue sharing 
features of the Act, that consent would not cure the constitutional 
infirmities of the Act because it binds successor county commissions to 
comply with the Act. A governing body of a political subdivision 
cannot purport to bind its successors with respect to governmental or 
legislative p<?wers. Bair v. Lavton Citv Corp.. 6 Utah 2d 138, 307 P.2d 
895 (1957). If an entirely new Garfield County Commission opposed to 
the revenue sharing aspects of the Act were elected, it could not a.oid 
participation. The language of the Act is mandatory and includes no 
right for a county to "opt out." Only if the Act allowed each county 
to choose to participate or not every year would it provide for 
permissible revenue sharing. 
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does not even give counties the opportunity to consent. 
Accordingly, the lower court's decision must be reversed. 
II. MOUNTAIN STATES' CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS RAISE NUMEROUS 
UNRESOLVED GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT THAT PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE COUNTY 
Mountain States' Complaint raises various constitutional 
challenges to the validity of the Act. As discussed above, the 
first three claims for relief essentially assert that the Act 
violates Article XIII, § 5 of the Utah Constitution. The 
remaining claims set forth due process, equal protection and 
takings questions rife with factual issues that must be resolved 
— but were improperly ignored — by the district court. Summary 
judgment, therefore, was improper. 
A. Mountain States Was Entitled To Complete Discovery 
Prior To The Trial Court's Summary Disposition Of 
This Case 
Prior to the entry of summary judgment below, Mountain 
States filed an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f), U. R. Civ P., 
outlining the issues requiring further discovery and requesting a 
90-day continuance to permit Mountain States to conduct that 
discovery. Record at 178-179. Mountain States asserted that it 
would be error to enter summary judgment on the record then 
before the trial court because there were certain factual issues 
relating to the facial and as-applied challenges on which no 
evidence was before the court and with respect to which Mountain 
States had not yet been able to conduct discovery. Record at 
123, 128-136. The Garfield County defendants, moreover, had 
previously conceded that the resolution of Mountain States' 
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claims would require subs tant ia l factual development. But, 
notwithstanding Mountain S t a t e s ' request for time to complete 
discovery and the county defendants' concession that "there are 
numerous issues which are county specif ic and which require in 
our judgment, resor t to tax records within each county" (Exhibit 
E), the d i s t r i c t court summarily concluded that the Act " is 
cons t i tu t iona l in a l l r e spec t s . " Record at 246, % 14. This is 
plain er ror . In the words of defendants' own counsel, Mountain 
States i s en t i t l ed to " resor t to [the] tax records within each 
county" to resolve the "numerous issues [in t h i s case] which are 
county spec i f i c . " Exhibit E. 
21. In May of 1988, attorneys for Mountain States f i l e d an action in each 
of the 29 counties of the s t a t e . Some of those actions were f i l e d on 
behalf of Mountain States while others were f i l e d on behalf of other 
taxpayers. By a l e t t e r dated June 6, 1988, to William C. Vickery, 
State Court Administrator, attorneys for Mountain States requested that 
a l l 29 actions be reassigned and consolidated in the Third Judicial 
Dis tr ic t Court for Salt Lake County pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-24(1) . Counsel for the Garfield County defendants objected to 
consolidation in a l e t t e r to William Vickery dated June 15, 1988, in 
which he stated: 
While there i s a common legal question, i . e . , the 
cons t i tu t iona l i ty of the assess ing and co l l e c t ing 
s ta tute , there are numerous issues which are county 
spec i f i c and which require in our judgment, resort to 
tax records within each county, assessment records 
within each county, and treasurers records within each 
county. 
To be s p e c i f i c , in each case there i s an assert ion 
concerning the amount i t costs to assess and c o l l e c t 
property .taxes in each spec i f i c county and how that 
compares to the spec i f i c amount of ta>es paid by each 
taxpayer within that county. 
A copy of that June 15, 1988 l e t t e r i s attached hereto as Exhibit E. 
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B. The Article XIII, Section 5 Analysis Would Benefit 
From Further Factual Development Prior To Judicial 
Resolution 
As shown above (Section IA), Article XIII, § 5 of the 
Utah Constitution imposes a structural limitation upon the taxing 
authority of the legislature. Because of the vast ramifications 
of the state's taxing power — not the least of whicn is its 
potential to virtually obliterate local government — the 
legislature is unequivocally prohibited from imposing taxes for 
local purposes. State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061 
(1901). This division of authority is in harmony with American 
history and constitutional law, with "our notions of 
decentralization of power, and with the spirit and genius of our 
institutions." 46 A.L.R. 607, 615 (1927). 
On the present record, the trial court should not have 
summarily resolved the questions whether the Act imposes a tax 
for local purposes, unduly infringes the guaranty of local self-
government, or constitutes impermissible revenue sharing. For 
example, although there is apparently no dispute as to whether 
22 
the local levy is imposed by the legislature, there is a 
dispute as to whether the local levy is imposed for "the purpose 
of [a] county." Article XIII, § 5. Critical to the resolution 
of this issue is evidence, conspicuously absent at the time the 
trial court terminated these proceedings below, as to the 
specific expenses that are paid by counties with the proceeds of 
22. Mountain States does not dispute the lower court's finding that the 
local levy is a tax imposed by the legislature. Record at 244-245, 
1 7. 
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the tax. To the extent that the proceeds of the Act are used to 
pay the expenses of counties and county officials in connection 
with the performance of their official duties, such proceeds are 
used for county purposes. Section I, supra. 
Evidence regarding the above matters is exclusively 
within the control of the defendants in this lawsuit and the 
defendants in the 29 other lawsuits now pending throughout the 
23 
s t a t e . The county defendants, however, have f a i l e d to produce 
i t in connection with t h e i r motion for summary judgment. As 
noted above, Mountain States has not been given the necessary 
opportunity to develop the necessary evidence. Because t h i s 
information i s material and relevant to the reso lut ion of the 
Ar t i c l e XIII, § 5 claims raised here, the Court should reverse 
and remand t h i s act ion for further proceedings in the d i s t r i c t 
court. Rule 5 6 ( f ) , Utah R. Civ P. 
C. Mountain S t a t e s ' Due Process, Equal Protection and 
Takings Claims Are Not Ripe for Summary Judgment 
As s e t forth in the Complaint, Mountain S t a t e s ' due 
process , equal protect ion and takings claims turn upon whether 
the amount of the loca l levy bears a reasonable re lat ionship to 
various other aspects of the Act. Reasoned analys i s of these 
23. Mountain States i s a lso a p l a i n t i f f in actions s imilar to th i s one in 
various other count ies . Mountain States has attempted to conduct 
written discovery concerning budget l ine items and actual expenditures 
in four of th^ other counties , a l l of which are represented by the same 
spec ia l deputy county attorney, in three j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t s . Each time 
i t has served discovery requests, counsel for the county defendants 
here has f i l e d a motion to stay that act ion and a motion for a 
protect ive order prohibit ing discovery unt i l th i s appeal i s resolved. 
To date Mountain States has been permitted to proceed with discovery 
only in Box Elder County. 
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2. Due Process Analysis of Taxes 
Mountain States' due process challenge is based on the 
due process clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Article I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution, which are virtually 
coextensive in their meaning and application. See Untermyer v. 
State Tax Commission, 102 Utah 214, 129 P.2d 881 (1942). In 
order to satisfy due process there must be a reasonable 
relationship between a tax rate and the taxed activity. Mobil 
Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes. 445 U.S. 425, 436-37, 100 
S.Ct. 1223 (1980) (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 
272-73, 98 S.Ct. 2340 (1978)). Moreover, special assessment 
taxes, i.e., taxes that are imposed "to reimburse the state for 
the costs incurred in providing specific quantifiable services," 
are subject to special scrutiny in this regard. Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana. 453 U.S. 609, 623 n.12, 101 S.Ct. 2946, 
25 
(1981). These taxes , which include the local levy, pass muster 
under the due process clause only upon a "showing based on 
factual evidence, in the record, that the fees charged do not 
appear to be manifestly disproportionate to the serv ices rendered 
3. Takings Analysis of Taxation 
Mountain S ta te s ' takings challenge i s based on Art ic le 
XI, § 22 of the Utah Constitution, which provides that "[p]rivate 
25. From the face of the Act i t is clear that the local levy is "assessed 
to reimburse the state for the costs of providing a specific 
quantifiable service," i . e . . assessment and collection of property 
taxes. qptWMIlw l^th SfllSPtt Cp, vt Mont»M> 453 U.S. at 623 n. 12. 
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issues cannot proceed in a factual vacuum. As a result, the 
summary judgment entered below was inappropriate because it 
deprived Mountain States of the opportunity to develop these 
claims through discovery. Rule 56(f), Utah R. Civ P. 
1. Equal Protection Analysis of Taxes 
Mountain States' equal protection challenge is based on 
Article I, § 24 of the Utah Constitution and the equal protection 
clause of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Both of those 
provisions restrain legislatures from the "fundamentally unfair 
practice of creating classifications that result in different 
treatment being given to persons who are, in fact, similarly 
situated, all of which redounds to the detriment of some of those 
so classified." Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp.. 752 P.2d 884, 886-88 (Utah 1988).24 In order to assure 
equal treatment to all similarly situated taxpayers, equal 
protection requires that a tax — even a general revenue raising 
tax — bear a reasonable relationship with the taxable event. 
City of Los Anaeles v. Shell Oil Co., 480 P.2d 953, (Cal. 1971). 
This reasonable relationship test necessarily involves a factual 
inquiry: whether the measure of the tax is reasonably related to 
the taxable event such that the tax does not result in the 
imposition of unfair or discriminatory burdens on a class of 
taxpayers. Id. See also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 
483 U.S. 825, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3147 n. 4 (1987). 
24. A corollary of equal protection is that persons differently situated 
should not be treated similarly. See Citv of Los Angeles v. Shell Oil 
Co.. 4 Cal. 3d 108, 480 P.2d 953, 962, 93 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1971). 
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property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
2 6 
just compensation." The purpose of this provision is to bar 
government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. ct. at 
3147. Thus, unless government action affecting a party is 
reasonably related to public need, the action violates the 
property clause because that party is bearing an unfair share of 
public burdens. Id. at 3147-50. Therefore, a tax, (such as the 
local levy) which is designed to compensate counties for the 
costs of assessing and collecting property taxes must bear a 
reasonable relationship to the burden created by the assessment 
and collection of those taxes from a given taxpayer. 
4. The Factual Record Before the Trial Court 
The trial court's dismissal of Mountain States' due 
process, equal protection and takings claims was based entirely 
on its conclusion that the local levy was a "tax" and not a 
"fee." As demonstrated above, however, the simple denomination 
of the local levy as a "tax" does not circumvent due process, 
equal protection, or takings clause scrutiny. That scrutiny, 
moreover, unequivocally requires development of a factual record. 
Mountain States, however, was prevented by the lower court's 
ruling from developing — and the Garfield County defendants did 
not even attempt to submit — any evidence regarding the 
26. The language of this provision is substantially identical to the 
property clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
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re la t ionship between the measure of the loca l levy and the use of 
county resources in the assessment and c o l l e c t i o n of property 
taxes from various c l a s s e s of taxpayers, or the re la t ionsh ip 
between the loca l levy imposed on a given taxpayer and the cost 
of assess ing and c o l l e c t i n g property taxes from that taxpayer. 
I t was, therefore , p la in error for the court to grant summary 
judgment. See Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 
(1960) (summary judgment i s inappropriate unless the moving party 
proves that the disfavored party cannot produce any evidence in 
i t s favor)• 
Furthermore, from the face of the Act i t appears that 
Mountain S t a t e s ' due process , equal protect ion and takings c lause 
claims are meritorious. For example, with respect to Mountain 
S t a t e s ' equal protect ion chal lenge, i t appears that the measure 
of the loca l levy — property value — bears no reasonable 
re la t ionsh ip to the use of county resources to c o l l e c t and assess 
property taxes because the levy i s uniformly applied to l o c a l l y 
27 assessed as well as centra l ly assessed property and because the 
27. Property tax assessment duties in Utah are divided between the State 
Tax Commission and the counties . The State Tax Commission assesses 
property that operates as a unit across county l i n e s , property of 
public u t i l i t i e s and mining properties ("centrally assessed 
propert ies") . Utah £ode Ann. § 59-2-201. With respect to central ly 
assessed property, the counties are required to do nothing more than 
prepare and mail the tax not ices and deposit the taxpayers' checks. 
The county, on the other hand, assesses a l l othir property ("local ly 
assessed property"). With respect to l o c a l l y assessed property, the 
county has the added burden of conducting appraisals and reappraisals 
as property i s ftought and sold, and of holding valuation hearings to 
consider valuation disputes . Because Mountain States i s a public 
u t i l i t y , i t s property i s centra l ly assessed. Garfield County does 
nothing more than prepare and mail a property tax notice and receive 
Mountain States ' payment. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Act contemplates tha t taxpayers in cer ta in counties wil l actually 
pay an amount in excess of t h e i r pro-ra ta share of those 
count ies ' assessment and col lec t ion budget. For the same 
reasons, i t appears tha t there i s no ra t iona l re la t ionship 
between the amount of the local levy imposed on any given 
taxpayer and the costs of assessing and col lec t ing property taxes 
from tha t taxpayer. For example, one taxpayer in Millard County, 
Intermountain Power Agency, paid a local levy of over $1 million 
in 1987, even though Millard County's t o t a l assessment and 
co l lec t ion budget was only $400,000 and Intermountain Power 
Agency's property i s a cen t ra l ly assessed property with respect 
to which Millard County has only minimal r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 
Mountain States i s unaware how many taxpayers bear a 
disproport ionate burden, s imilar to tha t borne by Intermountain 
Power Agency, which bears absolutely no re la t ionship to the cost 
of assessing and co l lec t ing i t s property taxes . Such data, which 
as outlined above i s necessary for Mountain States to develop i t s 
due process, equal protect ion and takings clause challenges, are 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Notwithstanding the c lear differences in the extent of the burden borne 
by the county with respect to l o c a l l y assessed property and central ly 
assessed property, the Act does not d i f f erent ia te between the local 
levy rate for each c la s s of property. Mountain States argued below 
that i t bel ieved the cost of printing and mailing tax notices was 
minimal compared to the cost imposed on Mountain States by the local 
levy. If indeed Mountain States ' b e l i e f i s correct , under the 
standards se t forth in Los Angeles v. Shell Oil . 480 P.2d 953, the Act 
v i o l a t e s the equal protect ion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
Art ic le I Section 24 of the Utah Constitution because i t taxes l o c a l l y 
assessed property and centra l ly assessed property at the same rate, 
notwithstanding the dispari ty of the counties ' burdens with respect to 
the di f ferent c la s se s of property. 
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in the exclusive control of the counties. Prior to the ruling 
below, Mountain States had commenced discovery to compile the 
data necessary to support its challenges. By entering summary 
judgment prior to Mountain States' receipt of even the first set 
of responses, however, the trial court erroneously deprived 
Mountain States of the opportunity to fairly present its case. 
Counsel for the county defendants has similarly prevented 
Mountain States and other taxpayers from developing the necessary 
information in other counties by moving to stay discovery 
everywhere it has been sought. The trial court's error and the 
defendants' attempts to prevent discovery require reversal and 
remand for further discovery. 
D. If The Act Is Not Facially Invalid, Mountain States 
Is Entitled To Further Discovery On Its Due Process 
Claim 
In addition to the "reasonable relationship" due process 
challenge discussed above, Mountain States challenges the Act on 
the ground that it violates due process by permitting taxation of 
persons who have no nexus with the taxing counties. Mountain 
States challenged the Act on its face on grounds that it violates 
due process by permitting taxation of persons who have no nexus 
28 
with the taxing count ies . This claim i s simply a restatement 
of the "taxation without representation" pr inc ip le that spawned 
28. In order to s a t i s f y the requirements of due process a taxpayer must 
have a " s u b s t a n t i a l connect ion ," or nexus, with the taxing e n t i t y . 
Mobil Oil Corp! v. Commissioner. 445 U.S. 425, 436-37, 100 S.Ct. 1223 
(1980), filing Moorman Mf?. Co. v. Balr . 437 U.S. 267, 272-73, 98 s .Ct . 
2340 (1978); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board. 463 
U.S. 159, 164, 103 S.Ct. 2933, 2940 (1983); Citv of Los Angeles v. 
Shel l Oil Co.. 4 Cal. 3d 108, 480 P.2d 953, 93 Cal. Rptr . 1 (1971). 
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the American Revolution. This defect in the Act is perhaps its 
most offensive aspect. 
The Act requires each county to participate in the 
uniform state-wide local levy rate. Instead of bearing the 
responsibility to the voters of the state of establishing how the 
revenues raised by the local levy will be spent, the state 
abdicates that role to the counties. The uniform-statewide local 
levy is established by the combined assessment and collection 
budgets of every county in the state. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-19-15(3). Consequently, each expenditure included in the 
assessment and collection budget of a given county increases the 
statewide tax rate, and ultimately, increases the tax burden of 
every owner of taxable property in the state* As a result, the 
amount of taxes paid by the constituents of a given county is 
based on the assessment and collection budgets adopted by the 
other 28 counties. The Act also contemplates that taxes 
collected from taxpayers in some counties will be paid to other 
counties that will spend those funds for their own assessment and 
collection purposes. Taxpayers in a given county are thereby 
deprived of political control over the manner in which their 
taxes are spent. Thus, taxpayers are taxed for the benefit of 
jurisdictions with which they have no nexus and in which they 
have no political input. The Act, therefore, violates the due 
29 process clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions. 
29. Although a political jurisdiction is not limited to imposing taxes on 
only those imbued with the voting franchise, it cannot discriminate 
against those who do not have political power. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Mountain States argued below and s t i l l maintains that 
the Act i s f a c i a l l y unconst i tut ional because i t s language — in 
fact i t s very ex i s tence — contemplates that taxpayers in some 
counties w i l l ac tua l ly be taxed by other count ies . Record at 
147-48. Accordingly, .f summary judgment i s to be granted at 
t h i s point , i t must be entered in favor of Mountain S ta te s . 
However, should t h i s Court conclude that t h i s claim i s not yet 
r ipe for summary d i s p o s i t i o n , Mountain States i s e n t i t l e d to 
conduct discovery to prove that the Act, as applied, r e s u l t s in 
the taxat ion of taxpayers having no nexus with the taxing county. 
See Bridge v. Backman. 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 P.2d 909 (1960). 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
I t is an axiom of our law that the power to tax is 
a power to destroy. Where the amount of the tax to be 
raised, or the rate of taxation, is determined by the 
legis la ture i t se l f , the taxpayers who are to be charged 
with the taxes have a r ight to , and an opportunity to be 
heard by the legis la ture upon the subject of the 
taxation, including the purpose of the tax, the needs of 
the public for the promotion of the object for which the 
taxes are to imposed, the amount of taxation required 
for those needs, and the amount which can be properly 
and jus t ly charged against the taxpayers. 
MlchUM Cgntyri R»Ug9»4 Cp, v, Power?, 201 U.S. 245, 26 S.Ct. 
459 (1906). Se? a\$Q Cpptfrlftjr Corp. of An^yi^ v, Franchise Ta^ 
Board. 463 U.S. 159, 204-5 (Powell J . , d issent ing) . In the 
instant case,, t i t appears that not only does Mountain States lack 
p o l i t i c a l power to control tax rates under the Act, but no one 
else i s in a posit ion to protect the in te res t s of taxpayers 
because the Act effectively disseminates the responsibi l i ty 
beyond the control of any substant ial e lec tora te . 
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CONCLUSION 
To the extent the constitutional issues presented are 
ripe for summary disposition, applicable law requires the entry 
of summary judgment in favor of Mountain States. If the Court 
concludes that the present claims require further factual 
development, the judgment below should be reversed and remanded 
for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /4/<gday of March, 1989. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
Mark K. Buchi 
Richie D. Haddock 
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jovernmentai Affairs Division 
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STEPHEN -J. SORENSON. ( ' H I K F 
_ ticja1: or Q\ , .son 
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CI J\\ Enfo-"cerr,en- Di /iSion 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
Judge, Sixth Judicial District Court 
for Garfield County 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
RE: Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. 
Garfield County, et al., Case No. 3273 
Dear Judge Tibbs: 
With a motion for summary judgment pending, I provide 
this response regarding the position of the State defendants. 
The State defendants in this case are the Utah State 
Tax Commission, R. H. "Hal" Hansen, Chairman of the Utah State 
Tax Commission, Roger 0. Tew, Utah State Tax Commissioner, Joe B. 
Pacheco, Utah State Tax Commissioners, G. Blaine Davis, Utah 
State Tax Commissioner, Tom L. Allen, Utah State Auditor, and 
Edward T. Alter, Utah State Treasurer. 
These State defendants have ministerial or 
administrative roles under the statute at issue, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-19-15 (Supp. 1988). These roles are in contrast to the role 
of the counties, which receive and use money raised by the tax 
levies at issue. The counties, therefore, rather than the State 
defendants are the real parties in interest. 
The counties are vigorously and adequately representing 
the interest in upholding the statute at issue. The Attorney 
General has provided an opinion on the central issue involved, 
which opinion speaks for itself. The opinion is already a part 
of the court record and is hereby tendered to assist in 
addressing the issue. The opinion is an analysis that does not 
purport to bind the court and is not an unequivocal declaration 
of constitutionality or unconstitutionality. 
2 3 6 STATE CAPITOL • SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 841 14 • TELEPHONE 8 0 1 - 5 3 8 - 1 0 1 5 
The Honorable Don V. Tibbs 
August 26, 1988 
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Under these circumstances the State defendants do not 
intend to be active as legal advocates in this case. 
Very truly yours, 
RALPH L FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Governmental Affairs Division 
RLF/cwc 
cc: Patrick B. Nolan, Esq, 
Bill Thomas Peters, Esq. 
David K. Detton, Esq. 
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ANSWER: 
The Honorable Glen E. Brown, 
Speaker# Utah House of Representatives 
David L. Wilkinson, Attorney General 
Ralph L. Finlaysonf Assistant Attorney General 
Whether S.B. No. 151--County Collection Costs, 
passed in the 1986 General Session of the 
Legislature, violates Article XIII, Section 5 
of the Utah Constitution. 
See CONCLUSION. 
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Tha Honorable Glen E. Brown, Speaker Formal Opinion No. 88-01 
February 11, 1988 
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This Formal Opinion la virtually identical to Informal 
Opinion No. 87-47, issued November 25, 1987. Although an 
Informal Opinion is "official,' this is being issued aa a Formal 
Opinion because of its importance, nothing having been brought to 
our attention to question the Informal Opinion's conclusions. 
Tha opinions respond to the request of Speaker Glen E. Brown of 
the Utah Rouse of Representatives asking review by this office of 
S.B. No. 1S1 for constitutionality. Tha indicated bill was 
passed by the Legislature in the 1986 General Session and was 
signed into law by the Governor. • It enacts a somewhat 
complicated method of defraying the coats counties incur to 
assesst collect and distribute property taxes.1 
ANALYSIS 
Tha Bill 
Since the time of your request wa have had a chance to 
review the bill at greater length and to research its legal 
implications. Tha scheme established in tha bill is, ^M 
indicated, somewhat involved. Under it, tha board of county 
commissioners of each county first determines the county's cost 
of "assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes 
and related appraisal programs", and submits that figure (a 
"budget") to the State Auditor for review. 
The State Auditor, according to rules he is required to 
have established, then reviews and certifies each of the county 
budget figures. Then the State Auditor transmits the aggregated 
statewide costs—presumably a single figure—to the State Tax 
Commission, which is required to establiah a mandatory statewide 
tax rate sufficient to raise the amount represented by the figure 
given it by tha Auditor, on condition that tha tax rate not 
exceed a maximum of .0005 of assessed valuation. Tha county 
Auditor includes tha rata thus fixed, as a aaparataly listed and 
identified local levy, in tha tax notice iaauad to the taxpayer. 
* A copy of an enrolled copy of S.B. No. 151 is attached as 
Appendix A for reference. Although the Office of Legislative 
Research and General Counsel did not find unconstitutionality in 
the course of ita preparation of tha bill, and tha Attorney 
General9a office did not find any obvious conatitutional flaw in 
its limited review of the bill following passage, it should be 
recognised that tha mechanisms established by the bill are 
somewhat involved, and that the review by the two Indicated 
officea waa neceaaarily limited in the preaa of the processing of 
large numbers of bills within short, fixed time periods. 
Tht Honorable Glen E. Brown, Speaker Formal Opinion No. 38-01 
February 11* 1988 
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Under subsection (6) of Section 17-19-15 of the act, 
revenues received by each county in excess of the amount set in 
the certified budget are required to be transmitted to the State 
Treasurer *for equalization and distribution to the counties in 
accordance with the certified budgets.9 That is, counties that 
collect more than their budgeted figure provide that excess to 
counties that collect less than their budgeted figure, the tax 
payers in counties with larger tax bases subsidizing the tax 
payers in counties with smaller tax bases. As an example, it is 
my information that one taxpayer in a particular county had been 
assessed a tax under the bill which substantially exceeds the 
cost for collection budgeted for that entire county. The excess 
in that county of collections over the budgeted cost would be 
transferred by state officials, under the bill, to those counties 
which collect less than their budgeted costs* 
An argument has been suggested in support of the bill 
that it eliminates local controversy in defraying the costs of 
collecting property taxes in that state, rather than local, 
officials certify the budget figures, set the tax rate and 
"equalize* the tax proceeds collected. One argument that has 
been suggested in opposition to the bill is that it eliminates 
the incentive of each county to economize in its tax collection 
process and conversely gives incentive to each county 
artificially to increase its budget for collecting taxes on the 
theory that someone else will pay for however much the budget 
exceeds collections. These kinds of policy arguments are outside 
the purview of our legal review. This review is limited to 
consideration of whether the act violates the Constitution. 
Tht Constitutions! Provision 
The constitutional provision which we have been asked 
to measure the act against is Article XIII, Section S of the Utah 
Constitution. That section reads as follows: 
The Legislature shall not impose taxes for 
the purpose of any county, city, town or 
other municipal corporation, but may, by law, 
vest in the corporate authorities thereof, 
respectively, the power to ^MU%MB and collect 
taxes for all purposes of such corporation. 
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
contained in this Constitution, political 
subdivisions may share their tax and other 
revenues with other political subdivisions as 
provided by statute. 
Tha Honorabla Glan E. Brown, Speaker Formal Opinion No. 88-01 
Fabruary il, 1988 
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It ia aignificant to nota that tha second aantanca in tha aaction 
was addad by a constitutional amendment that took affact January 
1, 1983. No casa decided before that date, therefore, was 
aubjact to tha allowances and requirements of the amendment. And 
wa know of no casa that has construed the section since that 
amendment. 
Tht Casta 
There are, nevertheless-, soma Utah caaas which have 
construed and applied Article XIII, Section 5, all of which were 
decided before the aaction waa amended.2 in aaveral of the 
earlier casaa no conatitutional violation waa found, yet in a 
largar number of tham tha legislative achame at issue was held to 
violate tha constitutional provision. In tha more recent cases, 
which find no conatitutional violation, tha court9a focus clearly 
has shifted from tha principle of local control to pragmatic 
accommodation of perceived public benefit. Tha Court in The Best 
Foods v. Chriatsnsan. 28S P. 1001 (Utah 1930) found no violation 
of Article XIII, Section 5 under the facta of that case. It 
based its conclusion that tha atatuta involved waa not 
unconstitutional on tha fact that tha atatutorily imposed $5 
annual permit fee payable by a seller of oleomargarine to the 
general fund of a county, city or town waa not a tax but 
compensation for services rendered to tha atata by the entity 
issuing the parmit and assisting tha atata to enforce the act 
creating tha fee. Yet that casa providaa one of the clearer 
statements of the purpose of Article XIII, Section 5, in the 
following language: 
There can be no doubt but that tha framers 
of our atata Conatitution recognised the 
rights of tha paopla of Utah to local self-
government. It waa to praaarva local self-
government free from naadleaa legialative 
intarfacanca that tha power to levy taxes for 
local purposes waa by tha atata Conatitution 
veeted exclusively in the propar authority of 
countiea, citiaa, towns, and other municipal 
corporations. Tha power to collect and 
control tha revenues of a municipality ia of 
tha vary essence of local self-government. 
Id. at 1003. 
* Caaaa from varioua juriadictiona conatruing conatitutional 
proviaiona aimilar to tha original firat aantenca of tha Utah 
Section are summarised in 106 A.L.R. 908 and 46 A.L.R. 609. 
The Honorable Glen E. Brown, Speaker Formal Opinion No. 88-01 
February 11, 1988 
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In *Hin»V v« v*n D v k«- «« Utah 184, 240 P. 454 (1925), 
the act in question gave counties the legal power to enter into 
contracts for the expenditure of funds in its discretion. The 
Court upheld the act as against a claim, inter all*, that it 
imposed taxes for county purposes in violation of Article XIII, 
Section 5. The Court relied on the fact that Mtlhere ?was) no 
imposition of taxes, direct or indirect, by legislative authority 
upon the county, and no interference with local self-governmen^ 
by thm county.9 66 Utah at 192, 240 P. at 457 (emphasis added). 
Among the cases holding a Utah statute to be in 
violation of Article XIII, Section 5 is State v. Standford, 24 
Utah 148, 66 P. 1061 (1901), in that case, the state statute at 
issue required the county commission of each county with 5,000 or 
more trees to appoint a practical horticulurist as a tree 
inspector, and required that in counties having a population of 
20,000 or more, the county inspector appoint as many deputy 
inspectors as in the judgment of the inspector and the state 
board of horticulture were necessary to implement the statute. 
The statute required the county to pay the compensation of the 
inspectors and the statute fixed the pay. 
The Court stated that "(tlhe Constitution was doubtless 
framed with a purpose to protect the local self-governments which 
had existed of a practically uniform character from the early 
settlement of the country." 24 Utah at 157, 66 P. at 1062. Yet, 
-nder the statute, the county was compelled to audit and pay the 
monthly salaries of the inspector and deputies without its 
consent. Thus, held the Court, the statute was unconstitutional: 
In our opinion section 5, art. 13, of the 
constitution, not only limits local or county 
taxation to local county purposes, but it was 
also intended as a limitation upon the power 
of the legislature to grant the right or 
impose the duty of creating a debt or levying 
a tax to any person or body other than the 
corporate authorities of the county. Nor can 
the state compel a county to incur a debt or 
to levy a tax for the purpose named in the 
act without its consent. 
24 Utah at 161, 66 P. at 1063. 
In State v. Eldridg*. 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 337 (1904), 
the Court said that the State Board of Equalisation could 
constitutionally engage in 'adjusting and equalising the 
valuation of taxable property among the several counties of the 
State9 (27 Utah at 486, 76 P. at 340), but held that the 
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Legislature had no power to authorise the Board to 'assess or 
value property, for the purposes of taxation, the situs and 
operation of which are wholly within one county.• 27 Utah at 
488, 76 P. at 341. In dicta, the Court said also that the 
Legislature was without power to authorise tJie Board to levy and 
collect taxes on property. 27 Utah at 486, 76 P. at 340. 
In Smith v. Carbon County. 90 Utah S60, 63 P.2d 259 
(1936) the Court held that fees which did not bear a reasonable 
relation to the extent and nature of services of the county 
officer to whoa paid were taxes the levy of which violated, inter 
alia. Article XZIZ Section 5. Such taxes, said the Court, "may 
not be levied by the Legislature for the use and benefit of a 
county.0 90 Utah at 568, 63 P.2d at 262. 
Several more recent cases have rejected Article XXXI, 
Section 5 challenges to local financing programs on rationales 
that appear to have been pragmatically based on a perceived need 
to accommodate funding of public projects rather than on a 
determination that the principle of local control which underlies 
the constitutional provision waa not being undermined. They 
appear to reflect something of a deemphasis of the constitutional 
limitation and a deference to the judgment of the Legislature on 
economic issues. 
The Court in Triht v, Silt Ukt City Cord* 540 P.2d 
499, (Utah 1975), upheld, as against argument that it violated 
Article XIXX, Section 5, a statute that required a portion of 
property taxes to be diverted directly to help pay off revenue 
bonds issued by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency to 
finance a redevelopment project. It said that *in exercising the 
powers of the state the legislature may require the revenue of a 
municipality, raised by taxation, to be applied to uses other 
than that for which the taxes were levied." Id. at 504. The 
Court undertook no specific comparison of the statute with the 
constitutional provision involved. In S. L« Co. v. Murray City 
R»d«velQp.« 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), the county asserted 
violation of Article XIII, Section 5 on the ground chat the 
statute in question effectually required diversion of taxes 
assessed by the county for county purposes to the Defendant 
Murray City for Murray City Redevelopment. The Court rejected 
the argument in a rather complex discussion generally to the 
effect that the required diversion did not really affect the 
county's control over its taxing power and that the county was 
not harmed financially, thereby upholding the act %§ not in 
violation of Article XXXI, Section 5. 
Xt should be noted that a legislative scheme requiring 
taxes to be collected by counties for the benefit of school 
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districts has been distinguished from a scheme requiring taxes to 
be collected by counties for their QMJX use. fiat Board of 
Eduction v. Buraon. 62 Utah 162, 217 P. 1112 (1923); Board of 
Education v. o*in«*. 50 Utah 97, 166 P. 977 (Utah 1917). The 
Court in Tha Best Foods v. Christensen. 1285 P. 1001, 1004 (Utah 
1930) cited these cases in support of its dicta that the 
Legislature may, under settled authority, impose on a county the 
duty to impose taxes other than for its own purposes. The dicta 
may have been too broadly stated, yet it is safe to say that the 
courts have upheld financing programs under which counties 
collect taxes for school districts within their boundaries. 
All the cases discussed above were, and it can be 
assumed that all future cases will be, decided against the 
general background that "an act of the Legislature will not be 
declared unconstitutional if it can reasonably be construed to be 
constitutional,"3 and that "Iwlhere the language of a statute is 
equally susceptible to two constructions, one rendering it valid 
and the other invalid, the court must adopt the one which renders 
the statute valid,"4 but that when the "meaning of the 
constitutional provision cannot be harmonized with the statute" 
the statute will be declared unconstitutional. Berry v. Be#cft 
Aircraft. 717 P.2d 670, 684 (Utah 1985). 
Tha 1983 Constitutional Amendment 
The 1983 constitutional amendment to Section S of 
Article XIII appears not to eliminate the protection of a 
political subdivision against a state-imposed mandate that it 
impose taxes for its own use, or share them, theretofore provided 
by that section of the Constitution. The amending sentence 
provides that political subdivisions "BJ^L share their tax and 
other revenues with other political subdivisions." (Emphasis 
added.) That, of course, is permissive rather than mandatory 
language. 
Yet meaning must be given to the last words in the 
amending sentence, "by statute." It might be argued that "by 
statute" means the Legislature can mandate sharing, and that "may 
share" was meant not to preserve local control in the face of 
such a mandate, but was meant only to clear away a previously 
existing legal obstacle against horizontal revenue-sharing among 
3
 The Best Foods v. Christensen, 28S P. 1001, 1004 (Utah 1930) 
(citing cases). 
4 u . 
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political subdivision. In support of this argument it might be 
said, accurately in my view, that the recent cases dealing with 
Article XIII, Section 5 reflect more judicial interest in 
pragmatic accommodation of funding for projects adjudged by the 
Legislature to be invested with a public interest than in 
preserving the principle of local control.5 
Still, if this expansive interpretation of state 
legislative power had been intended, it would have been natural 
directly to state something like, •The Legislature may, by 
statute, require political subdivisions to share their tax and 
other revenues" rather than, as the amendment does, state the 
provision in terms of what "political subdivisions may" do. 
Further, that this expansive, unnatural interpretation of the 
amendment is not correct is reinforced by authoritative sources 
that accompanied the amendment in its sojourn to adoption* 
The long title of the resolution proposing the 
amendment that became effective in 1983 described the amendment 
as "PROVIDING FOR PERMISSIVE SHARING OF REVENUES BETWEEN 
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE." S.J.R. No. 3, Tax Article 
Revision, 1982 Budget Session. Utah State Legislature (emphasis 
added)• The official ballot title described the amendment as one 
"to allow local governments to share tax and other revenues." 
Utah Voter Information Pamphlet, General Election, November 2, 
5
 See Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp.. S40 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975); S. 
La Co. v. Murray City Redevelop.. 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979). See 
also A. Lynn, Jr., Financing Modernized and Unmodernized Local 
Government in the Age of Aquarius, 1971 Utah L. Rev* 30, 39. 
Similar judicial movement toward accommodating new methods of 
financing projects the Legislature declares to be in the public 
interest, and away from strictly construing constitutional 
limitations on legislative power, is reflected in the case of 
UaT.F.C. v. Wilkinson, 723 P.2d 406 (Utah 1986). Though the 
Court in the U.T.F.C. case did strike down as unconstitutional 
the only feature of the Act regarding which U.T.F.C. had asked 
the Court to make a declaration, it was plain that the Court did 
so only reluctantly, and under the mandate of a constitutional 
clause (barring subscription to stock) so unambiguous as to be 
impossible to evade. And the Court read the other clause 
involved (forbidding the Legislature from authorizing the State 
to lend its credit) in a very narrow way. Justice Zimmerman, in 
a separate concurrence, described the section of the Constitution 
involved in that case (Article VI, Seciton 29) as "two archaic 
limitations on the powers of state and local government." Li. at 
416. 
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1982 (emphasis added)* The section in the 1982 Voter Information 
Pamphlet titled "Impartial Analysis9 and prepared by the Office 
of Legislative Research and General Counsel is most telling, it 
includes the following: 
Past legal opinions indicate that Article 
XIII, Section 5 prevents the local govern-
ments from sharing their tax revenues with 
each other. The proposed revision would 
Iter this prohibition and allow local 
governments *t their option to share tax 
revenues* 
I£. (emphasis added) • 
All of these official legislative and ballot sources 
clearly indicate that the amendment operates to allow revenue 
sharing at the option of the local governments involved. There 
is no statement or assertion in any of them that suggests, 
directly or indirectly, that the amendment would permit the 
Legislature, by statute, to impose revenue sharing on any county 
without its consent. And though these official sources are not 
the law itself, they are authorative indicators of the 
amendment's meaning. Perhaps even more important, they are 
official sources that informed the voting legislators and 
electors of the meaning of the amendment, and presumably were 
relied upon as bases for voting. 
That the 1983 constitutional amendment does not 
establish in the Legislature power to require a political 
subdivision to share its tax revenues without its consent is also 
supported by the basic cannons of construction that potentially 
inconsistent provisions of law "should be so construed [as] to 
give effect to both if possible." Pride Club v. Miii*r. 572 P.2d 
385, 387 (Utah 1977). If the new second sentence in Article 
XIII, Section 5 were read to allow the Legislature to require a 
county to impose taxes for its own use, and the use of other 
counties without the consent of the taxing county, that sentence 
would appear to allow precisely what the original, and still 
existing, first sentence of that constitutional provision does 
not allow, under the interpretations the earlier Utah cases have 
given it. Such an anomalous reading is unsupportable, we submit, 
even under the later cases. 
Though the later cases deemphasize Article XIII, 
Section S and the rationale underlying it, they do not overrule 
the earlier cases enforcing it, and whatever interest there may 
be in reading the first sentence out of existence, it is, 
nonetheless, still there. The second sentence can be harmonized 
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with the first, giving effect to both, by reading the second 
sentence to preserve in the political sub-division the option to 
participate in revenue sharing and construing the language "as 
provided by statute* as empowering the Legislature to enact 
mechanisms to faciliatate revenue sharing if, and only if, all 
political subdivisions involved consent to it. 
Finally, without extending this opinion with further 
analysis, X would note that it appears that none of the results 
in the cases involving Article XMI, Section S already discussed 
would have been different had they been decided under the section 
as it was amended in 1983. 
Application of the Constitutional Provision, as 
Judicially Construed, to S.B. No. 1S1 
Functions established in the bill which may be seen as 
the Legislature's unconstitutionally "imposting] taxes for the 
purpose of any county" (Article XXZX, Section 5) include the 
following. 1) The bill requires counties to collect taxes for 
their own use and prescribes the mechanism for doing so. 2) The 
bill ultimately requires counties which collect more taxes under 
the billfs levy than their budgeted cost for assessment, 
collection and distribution of property taxes, to supply their 
excess collections to other counties without consent of the 
supplying counties. 3) The State Auditor certifies county budget 
figures upon which each county's share of the revenue depends, 
which function the Auditor has understood to include the power to 
disapprove a figure and require it to be revised.6 4) The State 
Tax Commission, a State entity, sets a tax rate binding on the 
counties. 5) The State Treasurer equalizes and distributes 
excess revenues collected by the counties and required by the 
bill to be transmitted to the Treasurer. 
* Various arguments that might be made regarding this feature 
requiring State Auditor certification include arguments that it 
1) empowers the State Auditor to disapprove a figure and require 
it to be revised and hence is unconstitutional, 2) does not 
empower the State Auditor to disapprove a figure and require it 
to be revised but only to place the figure in an appropriate 
budget category and hence, though not saving any disapproval or 
revision by the State Auditor from invalidity, the certification 
feature itself is not unconstitutional, and 3) empowers the State 
Auditor to disapprove a figure and require it to be revised and 
yet is not unconstitutional. 
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As already noted, two relatively recent casee dismissed 
Articlt XIII, Section 5 challenges against financing plans that 
were quite different from those involved in the earlier cases 
decided under that provision and from that involved here. Tribe 
v. Salt L*k* City Corp.. 540 Pe2d 499 {Utah.1975) (upholding a 
statute requiring a portion of property taxes collected by Salt 
lake County to be diverted directly to help pay off revenue bonds 
issued by the Salt Lake City Redevelopment Agency); S» L. Co. v> 
Murray City Redevelop., 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979) (upholding a 
statute authorising diversion of taxes MM39S39d by the county for 
county purposes to the Defendant Murray City for Murray 
redevelopment). Despite the factual distinctions it may be 
difficult to reconcile these decisions with the earlier cases, or 
for that matter, with the constitutional provision itself. 
Yet these later cases do not overrule the earlier 
cases, also discussed above, the holdings or dicta of all of 
which clearly would prohibit state legislation that imposes on 
county control of its taxing power as the bill in question does* 
£tft Sfcaf w. Stanford, 24 Utah 148, 86 P. 1061 (1901) (holding a 
state act unconstitutional under Article XXII, Section 5 and 
stating that the state cannot "compel a county to incur a debt or 
to levy a tax for the purpose named in the act without its 
consent- (66 P. at 1063)); State v. Eldrid?«. 27 Utah 477, 76 P. 
337 (1904) (holding that the State Board of Equalisation was 
barred by Article XIII, Section 5 from assessing or valuing 
property for the purpose of taxation within a county, and stating 
in dicta that the Board could not levy and collect taxes on 
property); Smith v- Carbon County. 63 P.2d 259 (1936) (holding 
state legislation imposing a state-assessed probate fee that 
amounted to a tax to violate Article XXII, Section 5); The Best 
Foods v. Christ*n«e»n. 285 P. 1001 (Utah 1930) (finding no 
violation of Article XIII, Section 5 under facts that showed the 
alleged tax was a small fee commensurate with services rendered, 
but stating strong diets in support of the importance of Article 
XIII, Section 5 as * protection of the principle of local self* 
government)! Ball#Y v. Van Dyk«. 66 Utah 184, 192, 240 P. 454, 
457 (1925) (finding no violation of Article XIII, Section 5 on 
grounds that '(t)here [was) no imposition of taxes, direct or 
indirect, by legislative authority upon the county, and no 
interference with local self-government by the county"). 
Features of the bill which appear particularly 
vulnerable are the legislative mandate that counties collect 
taxes for their own use, the requirement that counties which 
collect an excess over the cost figure assigned share revenues, 
without their consent, with other counties, and the State 
Auditor's power, to any extent the statute grants it, to control 
the cost figure to be used by each county. 
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CONCLUSION 
A statute requiring counties to collect taxes to cover 
their own costs of collecting taxes, without their consent to 
share their revenues with other counties, and to submit to other 
state controls of the type employed in S.B. No* 151 has not yet 
come before the Utah Supreme Court. Also, more recent decisions 
of that Court manifest greater concern for pragmatic 
accommodation of funding mechanisms authorized by the Legislature 
as in the public interest than for preservation of the principle 
of local self-government originally underlying Article XIII, 
Section S, which the earlier cases emphasized. So the conclusion 
to which the present Utah Court would come on the issue in the 
exercise of its discretion as interpreter of the Utah 
Constitution cannot be predicted with assurance. 
Nevertheless, the language of the constitutional 
provision itself, the line of cases construing it (softened by 
the later cases), and the history of the 1983 amendment as it 
went before the Legislature and the people, all tend to support 
the conclusion that S.B. No. 151 unconstitutionally intrudes on 
the right of local self-government vouchsafed to the counties 
under Article XIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution in the 
bill's mandate that counties collect taxes for their own use, 
regardless of their consent share their tax revenues with other 
counties, and submit to the other described state controls. 
Though the issue treated in this opinion is 
complicated, and prediction of how a Utah Court would resolve it 
is not free from doubt, we hope you will find our analysis 
helpful. 
Respectfully, 
OAVIO L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
(71<*ip4 IJciduu^ 
RALPH L. FINLAYSON 
Assistant Attorney G.ntral 
OLW/RLF/bki 
APPENDIX A 
COUNTY COLLECTION COSTS 
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All ACT IEUTINC TO COUNTIES; FIOVIDINC FOR TNC COLLECTION, ASSESSMENT, AND 
0IST1IIUT1ON COSTS CNAftCED IY TNt COUNTYJ ANO FtOVIDINC AN EFFECTIVE 
DATE. 
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAM CODE ANNOTATES ItSJ AS FOLLOWS: 
IEFEALS ANO ICENACTSl 
17-19-1S AS LAST AHEN9E0 IT CMAFTE1 II, UWS OF UTAH IMS 
•CFCAUt 
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ft* War* tf Ctntty tf»iMitwtrt tf ttch ttwwty awwwtlly thall ttparttcly 
larfttt ftr all ctttt (wcurrH in tht tMttttnt, ctUtttitw. tnt 
ilttfihttttn tf tftttrty ttitt tf>4 rtlttH twtittl trtttw tw< mb»it 
thttt hwltttt tt tht ttttt tuaittr ftf ttvit*. 
I. I. *•• 151 
(1) Tht ititt iv<it>r thill ttttblieh. hy rvlt. cateiorioe of 
allaweblt cteta and thai! certify eub«ittod budaote ftf ct«»lienct with 
tppravcd cttttofittt 
p ) tfpon review end certification by tht ttett auditor, tht enreietod 
etattwidt coata ahall bt trant»itted to tht Statt Tat Cotiiiion for 
determination tf a ttndatory atatewide tai rata eufficicnt te tcct thoit 
eipendituret* ly Junt 1 af tech year tht taa cotpieeion thai! ctrtify tht 
rata tt tach county alitor far iacluiiaa upon tht tai notice at a 
eeparattly Hated and identified local\lcv+» 
(4) Tht tat fata may not aaceed a saiit^a tf >0005 tf atiottcd 
valuation ttctpt ftrt (a) mandated tr formally adopted reappraisal 
trotraiii canfortini tt taa comitoioa rulet; tf (b) actiont required ta 
attt Itiielativtj judicialt tr admnittrativt ardert* Taiee levied for 
thia purpoie tty not bt included in detertinint tht tii»ua allowable levy 
far tht county tr any tthtr taaint district* 
(3) In iht initial yaar that tha levy adopted under thia etction it 
effective, tach taaint dietritt within cauntiee which had ttt previously 
levied atparttt teeteeiait ctlltctiat, and dietributint Itvite, ehall 
reduce ita trtttrty taa ltvy hy at atount etual tt that paid by tht ttiini 
dietritt it tht trtwitwa ytar far tht atat tf teeaeeini, collectint. ant 
diotrtbytlnt ttatt* 
(>) iavanyte rtctivtd hy tach caunty frtt tha ltvy authorised hy thia 
aactitt it tactaa tf tht ettunt aat ttt it tht ctrtifitd hudeet thai! bt 
tranititted tt tht ttttt Trttsurtr far aaualttatian and distributttn ta tht 
•!• 
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ttwntitt In accordance »tth tht certified OMdittt. Any rcvnwt ticot 
tttwltlwi f f — aw incrttit in collection rate* woon final icttlctwt chaU 
»t o'otoaitoo' »» tht ttatc tree»wrtr in a trmt account to »t tfjucttd 
eialwt iwbt»«<itM yttrt. 
taction 2. Section IMf-le, Utah Code Annotated 115), ee laat amended 
fcy Chapter t, U»f of Utah 1133, Firet Special Section, end Section 
17-11-17, Utah Code Annotated H53, *• laat eaended ty Chapter 4, Uwt of 
Utah 1153, Firtt Special Station, art repcoled. 
Stctitn 3, Thia act tahca tfftct on January I. H S 7 . 
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Exhibit C 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GARFIELD COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE : 
AND TELEGRAPH CO., : 
: DECISION AND 
Plaintiffs, : SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-vs- : 
GARFIELD COUNTY: THE : 
GARFIELD COUNTY BOARD OF : 
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS: : 
THOMAS HATCH, SHERRELL OTT, 
AND LOUISE LISTON, COUNTY : 
COMMISSIONERS: JUDY HENRIE, : 
COUNTY TREASURER: TOM : CASE NO. 3273 
SIMKINS, COUNTY ASSESSOR; : 
THE UTAH STATE TAX : 
COMMISSION: R.H. "HAL" : 
HANSEN, ROGER 0. TEW, : Judge Don V. Tibbs 
G. BLAINE DAVIS AND JOE B. : 
PACHECO, UTAH STATE TAX : 
COMMISSIONERS: TOM L. ALLEN, : 
UTAH STATE AUDITOR: EDWARD T. : 
ALTER, UTAH STATE TREASURER, : 
Defendants. 
This matter came on regularly before the Court pursu-
ant to Notice on Thursday, the 1st day of September, 1988, at 
the hour of 11:00 a.m., pursuant to Garfield County Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the alternative, for partial 
Summary Judgment; and Plaintiff, Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Plain-
tiffs appeared by and through their attorneys, Bruce Johnson of 
the firm of Holme Roberts and Owen, and the Garfield County 
Defendants appeared by and through their attorneys Patrick B. 
Nolan, Garfield County Attorney, and Bill Thomas Peters and Karl 
Hendrickson, Special Deputy Garfield County Attorneys. Ralph 
Finlayson, Deputy Attorney General for the State of Utah, 
appeared for and in behalf of the Utah State Tax Commission, 
Utah State Auditor and the Utah State Treasurer. And the Court, 
having considered the arguments of counsel in support of the 
respective Motions for Summary Judgment, and having reviewed the 
memoranda filed by the Defendants in support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in support of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment of the Garfield County Defendants, and Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Response to Plaintiffs' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and having further reviewed 
the Affidavits of L. Brent Gardner, Thomas Hatch, and Hazel 
Houston, and the Court having reviewed the file, exhibits, 
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affidavits and memoranda submitted by the parties and being 
fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing does 
hereby enter the following: 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-15 (The Act), 
establishes a comprehensive mechanism for funding the assessment 
of property and the collection and distribution of property tax 
revenues by the counties of the State of Utah. 
2. The Board of County Commissioners of Garfield County 
duly established the county budget for the cost of collection 
and distribution of property taxes and related appraisal 
programs. 
3. These costs were submitted to the State Auditor for 
review and certification as to compliance with the categories of 
approved costs contained in the rules promulgated by the State 
Auditor, (Utah State Administrative Rules R130-2). 
4. Plaintiffs did not appear at the Garfield County 
budget hearings to protest either the budget for assessing, 
collecting and distributing of property taxes, or the imposition 
of a separate tax levy. 
5. Garfield County is not prohibited from making 
expenditures disallowed by the State Auditor for inclusion in 
the uniform statewide levy, but must pay for those expenditures 
from other revenues. 
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6. Upon review and certification the State Auditor 
transmitted the aggregate state wide assessing, collecting and 
distributing costs to the State Tax Commission. 
7. The State Tax Commission calculated a uniform state-
wide tax rate sufficient to fund the total costs of assessing, 
collecting and distributing property taxes and transmitted said 
rate to each county. 
8. Each of the 29 counties including Defendant Garfield 
County imposed the tax rate calculated by the State Tax Commis-
sion and included it as a local levy on tax notices. 
9. The Act requires that the counties receiving property 
taxes from the levy in excess of the certified budget transmit 
the excess revenues to the State Treasurer for disbursement to 
the counties collecting less than their certified budgets. 
Defendant Garfield County was such a recipient county in 19 87. 
10. Local assessment levels have been challenged as inade-
quate in seven consecutive years of litigation by railroads 
alleging local commercial and industrial properties were under-
assessed; that the State Tax Commission had issued orders to 
counties directing them to increase the assessment levels in the 
previous four years; and that at least five law suits had been 
filed by the State Tax Commission against local county assessors 
alleging underassessment of locally assessed properties within 
their respective counties. (See Affidavit of L. Brent Gardner, 
dated July 12, 1988.) 
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11. S.B. 151 as codified into Utah Code Annotated, Section 
17-19-15, provides a funding mechanism to address a matter of 
state-wide concern in each of the individual counties including 
the accurate, equitable and fair assessment of locally assessed 
residential, commercial and industrial properties, and the 
effective, efficient collection of ad valorem property tax 
revenues. (See Affidavit of L. Brent Gardner, dated July 12, 
1988.) 
12. S.B. 151 (Utah Code Annotated Section 17-19-15), was 
viewed by the Utah State Office of Education, the Utah 
Association of Counties, the Utah School Board Association, and 
the Utah League of Cities and Towns, to be a positive solution 
to the problem of payment for assessing and collecting taxes and 
was supported by each of those representative organizations. 
(Affidavit of L. Brent Gardner, dated July 12, 1988, Attachment 
1.) 
The Court having heretofore identified the Material 
Undisputed Facts does hereby enter the following: 
DECISION 
1. Article XIII, Section 11 of the Constitution of Utah, 
establishes the State Tax Commission and provides specifically 
that: 
"Under such regulations in such cases and within the 
limitations as a legislature may prescribe, it shall 
review proposed bond issues, revise the tax levies of 
local governmental units, and equalize the assessment 
and valuation of property within the counties." 
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2. The Court rules that said constitutional provision 
gives the Utah State Tax Commission power to regulate and 
control local county boards of equalization, and local elected 
officials with respect to taxation matters. 
3. Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah requires that valuation and assessments within the 
various counties are to be equal and uniform and further 
requires that the Legislature provide by law a mechanism to 
secure a just valuation for taxation. 
4. Chapter 2 of Title 59, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, provides a comprehensive statutory framework with 
regard to time frames, procedures, standards and methods under 
which local assessors, treasurers, auditors and county boards of 
equalization must function, and to that end the Legislature and 
the Utah State Tax Commission have, to a large degree, assumed 
control of the local administration of the property tax system. 
5. Utah Code Annotated, Section 17-19-15, was passed by 
the Utah State Legislature to resolve disputes that heretofore 
existed between counties and cities and school districts. It 
was further passed by the Legislature to fund a legitimate 
state-wide purpose, that purpose being an equalized and 
efficient mechanism to pay for the costs of a state-wide 
property tax assessment, collection and distribution system. 
6. Senate Bill #151, codified at Utah Code Annotated 
17-19-15, duly enacted by the 1986 Legislature, is entitled to a 
6 
presumption of constitutionality as a valid legislative enact-
ment designed to establish a funding mechanism to promote 
efficient state-wide property tax assessment, collection and 
distribution and secure a just valuation for taxation. 
7. The Act and the tax levy imposed thereunder are in 
furtherance of the state-wide public purpose in addressing 
legislative concerns regarding equality and uniformity of 
assessment and an efficient means by which to assess, collect 
and distribute tax monies within the State of Utah. 
8. Since the Act does further a valid legitimate 
state-wide public purpose, the statute does not violate Article 
13, Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
9. The Court further rules that the Constitution of Utah 
Article VI §1 reserves to the Legislature authority to enact all 
laws not specifically prohibited. 
10. The Court further rules that to the extent said 
statutory provision results in revenue sharing, said revenue 
sharing does not violate Article 13, Section 5 of the Constitu-
tion of Utah, because to the extent revenues are transferred 
from one county to another to assist in funding the property tax 
administration system, that redistribution is clearly consistent 
with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, and in particular 
Tribe v. Salt Lake City Corp, 540 P.2d 499 (Utah 1975), and Salt 
Lake County v. Murray Redevelopment, 598 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1979), 
wherein the Supreme Court of Utah upheld the diversion of County 
7 
funds to a redevelopment agency for the purpose of alleviating 
the state-wide problem of blighted areas. 
11. The Court specifically concludes that the uniform 
state-wide administration of the assessment, collection and 
distribution of taxes to accomplish uniformity and equality of 
assessment is a legitimate state-wide concern and does not 
constitute the imposition of a purely local tax for a purely 
local purpose as was identified by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, 134 P.560 (Utah 
1913) , wherein that Court explained a public purpose for 
purposes of Article XIII, Section 5, was one "for the public 
good and not for a private purpose; that such purpose is not one 
which pertains to the corporate powers or interests of Salt Lake 
City." Here, as in Salt Lake County v. Salt Lake City, "the 
State...simply calls upon its agencies, the counties and the 
cities, to assist in discharging a public duty which in no way 
affects local self-government." 
12. The Court further rules that the county commission, by 
proposing and adopting a budget pursuant to Section 17-19-15, 
Utah Code Annotated, 19 53, as amended, has, to the extent they 
have proceeded to adopt said budget, voluntarily agreed to any 
revenue sharing that might take place as a result of the 
implementation of said statute. 
13. The Court finds that the state-wide tax rate 
established and levied pursuant to Section 17-19-15, constitutes 
8 
a tax and not a fee as argued by the Plaintiff in Plaintiffs1 
Memorandum and since said state-wide uniform levy is a tax, 
Plaintiffs1 4th, 5th, 6th 7th and 8th claims for relief are 
inappropriate and accordingly must be dismissed. 
14. Senate Bill 151, codified into Section 17-19-15, is 
constitutional in all respects, and that Defendants1 Motion for 
Summary Judgment be, and the same is hereby granted, and that 
the Plaintiffs1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment be, and the 
same is hereby denied. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the 
Garfield County Defendants, Garfield County, and the Garfield 
County Board of County Commissioners, Thomas Hatch, Sherrell 
Ott, Louise Liston; Judy Henrie, County Treasurer; Tom Simkins, 
County Assessor; are hereby granted Summary Judgment of no cause 
of action on Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company's 
complaint against the Garfield County Defendants, and said 
Complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this fj day of October, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
BPJ:H 
9 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on the 14th day of October, 1988, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision and 
Summary Judgment, to the following: 
Mr. Patrick B. Nolan 
Garfield County Attorney 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, Utah 84759 
Mr. David K. Detton 
Holme Roberts & Owen 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
50 South Main Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Mr. Bill Thomas Peters 
Special Deputy Garfield County Attorney 
Mr. Karl Hendrickson 
Special Deputy Garfield County Attorney 
Attorneys for Garfield County Defendants 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mr. Ralph Finlayson 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
ecretary 
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Exhibit D 
?&^ GARFIELD 
COUNTY FORM 6 
MEMORANDUM BUDGET 
SUMMARY 
ALLOCATED EXPENSES OF ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERCT TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1987 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
Department 
Coaaission 
Assessor 
Treasurer 
Auditor 
Recorder 
Attorney 
Data Processing 
Direct Cost 
7il9i.QQ 
59.217.00 
4?.?77.00 
4.627.00 
17.324.00 
5.OOP.00 
Percent of Total 
Department Budget 
10 ft 
<JQ if 
o* f\r 
8 lu-
SO tTf 
in dT 
100 
1 
\ 
1 
1 
\ 
1 
1 
I 
1 
1 
% 
\ 
I 
* 
t 
Total Direct Costs 
Tottl Indirect Costs 
< m?t497.nn 
I 14.128,00 (from Form 7) 
COOHTY TOTAL > 156,625.00 
GAEPIELD 
COUNTY i mrtmAA , • 
prrrR'Jri 
MEMORANDUM BUDGET 
DEPARTMENT EXPENSE ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES J*H 1 y IbBI 
FOR CALENDAR TEAR 1QS7 | 
! o l M AUDITOR 1 
DEPARTMENT COMMISSION 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
t 
* 
J . 
10. 
11. 
13. 
M 
I i 
I ii 
l,» 
i n 
I <i 
M 
i i 
i i 
,' 1 
>i 
Description 
Permanent Salaries 
Temporary Salaries 
Employee Benefits 
Put ] ic I o tices 
Irate! 
Office Supp] iff 
Postage 
Equipment supplies 
Telephone 
Professional and Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Purchase 
Miscellaneous Supplies 
Miscellaneous Sertices 
Subscriptions & Uemhemhipa 
. _ , _ 
TOTAL 
(Commission, Assessor, Treasurer, Auditor, 
Recorder, Attornef, Data Processing, etc.) 
Actual Expenses 
< H,2W>0<L, _ 
$ 
$ 20,064.00 
S 
$ 17,500.00 
1 1£!L.M.,.,,, 
in 
1 _ _ , „ 
| 2,000,00 
f 
f 
I 
S 
| 300.00 
I JOO.OO 
1 
t 
I 
S 
s 
$ _ ,. ,. 
s _ ._ 
$ _
 m 
s 
S71f912,00^ 
GARFIELD 
COUNTY 
MENOEANDUM B0D6B1 
DEPARTMENT EXPENSE ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1037 
FORM S 
DEPARTMENT: ASSESSOR {Cooni 
Recor 
Description 
ermanent Salaries 
temporary Salaries 
Employee Benefits 
4 
5 
6 
i 
\ 
1 
11. 
12 
1 1 
in , 
in 
I in 
mi i i i 
in i  
in in 
• 
, 
1" i l i i l n l i ' i i i t 1 ! i i i 
Ill I ' 111 | ) i l l 1 
f |'| i 
Postage 
Equipment Supplies »inten*i 
Telephone 
Professional and Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Purchase 
Miscellaneous Supplies 
Miscellaneous Services 
State Audit 
Publ icat ions 
Subscript ions I Memberships 
ion, Assessort Treasurert Auditor, 
r, Attorney, Data Processing, etc.) 
ctual Expenses 
20,580.00 
12,726.00 
15i6lOtQQ 
3.700.00 
2,000.00 
1.000,00 
1,000.00 
JU?OQ^M 
1 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
•2QQ,00 
?nn. no. 
TOTAL I 59^816.00^ 
GARFIELD 
COUNTY 
MEMORANDUM BUDGET 
DEPARTMENT EXPENSB ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1987 
FORM 5 
DEPARTMENT TREASURER (Commission, Assessor, Treasurer, Auditor, 
Recorder, Attorney, Dttt Processing, etc.) 
Description Actual Eipenses 
S. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Permanent Salaries 
Temporary Salaries 
Employee Benefits 
Travel 
nffiee ... s 
Postage 
Equipment Supplies jvenance 
Telephone 
Professional and Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Purchase 
Miscellaneous Supplies 
scellaneous Services 
^UPBCf-otionfi t Mmhfirnhlpa 
Bonds 
23. 
24. 
$ 20,580.00 
I 5,250.00 
9.4*7.00 
2,700.00 
2,000.00 
300.00 
350.00 
l.QQQ.on 
150.00 
6Q0.Q0 
TOTAL I <n.^77.ood; 
GARFIELD 
COUNTY 
MEMORANDUM BUDGET 
DEPARTMENT EXPENSE ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1987 
DEPARTMENT: CLERK/AUDITOR (Commission, Assessor, Treasurer, Auditor,, 
Recorder, Attorney, Data Processing etc ) 
Description Actual Expenses 
Permanent Salaries 
Temporary Salaries 
Employee Benefits 
Public Not i< .< -s 
Travel 
O f f i c e S' ipi Il ill 'ill 
Postage • 
Equipment Supplies 
Telephone 
Professional and Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Purchase 
Miscellaneous Supplies 
scellaneous Services 
SubscriptipoB fc Heaberflhlnn 
"1,092.00 
11,466.00 
**,937.00 
i,ooo,oo 
2,000.00 
3.000.00 
1,400.00 
2,500.00 
100.00 
,4§a^oo-
TOTAL "l " Hl'S.OOrt, 
Garfield 
COUNTT- " " ™* 
HEHCUNDUK BUDGET 
DEPARTMENT EXPEND E ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR TEAR ^37 
FORM 5 
HH'AHiruNi Recorder (Comission, A88essort Treasurer, Auditor, 
Recorder, Attorney, Data Processing, etc.) 
Description 
Per iiiii lent Sal at ic • 
Temporary Salaries 
Employee Benefit: • 
Public Notices 
Tc 'in i & 1 
Office Supplies 
Postage 
Equipment S u p p1i es • \ i i • 1 H ai nt enanc e 
Telephone 
. rofessional ai id Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Purchase 
1,111 Supplies 
u in Ser?ices 
. ._nL & Memberships 
Actutl 
% 
S 
$ 
$ 
* 
% 
$ 
s 
$ 
20 
7 
2 
3 
1 
Expenses 
580. 
,968 
,000 
,000 
00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
,000.00 
t_ 
$_ 
I. 
t_ 
t_ 
t. 
$. 
$_ 
$. 
$. 
s. 
s 
$. 
$ 
s 
100.00 
TOTAL 34,648.00(9 
Garfield 
&d- COUNTY I • :: i n « i 
HEHCttNDlffl BUDGET 
DEPARTMENT EXPENl E ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTT TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 1987 
I H,"II, HI III I II A t t o r n e y (Connies Ion, Assessor, Treasurer, Auditor 
Recorder, Attorney, Dttt Processing, ^ { 
Description *LIM i U L il>? JULS1 
III 
III i l l 
III I 
i» 
mi ii 
III 
ill in 
in 
III I 
I ' l l 
.- II 
2 2 . 
2 3 . 
I I I I l l l i H I I M H I I I ("I II I I II II lr III 
II I  I I I II II I II I 1 1 II II III III II I 
.mployee Bene! " • 
il nbl l r Nor.11 ¥§ 
II mi mi in M III 
HI | 11 <> S u p p l i e s 
Ii s t a g e 
Equipment Supplies and Maintenance 
lelephone 
professional and Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Pure' i(«t 
ii in ii a in i i lie ii II II u p p l l e s 
IN I • i e l l a n e o u s S e r f i c e s 
I r d i n i n g S e m i n a r s 
L a w L i b r a r y 
$ 22,680.00 
* 11,025.00 
$ 12,406.00 
S 2,500.00 
t 2.000-00 
$ 500.00 
j I,500.00 
S 2,000.00 
S 1.000.00 
t 2,000.00 
TOTAL 1 'j/,bl 1.00 i 
GARFIELD 
COUNTY 
MEMORANDUM BUDGET 
DEPARTMENT EXPENSE ALLOCATIONS TO COSTS OF 
ASSESSING AND COLLECTING PROPERTY TAXES 
FOR CALENDAR YEAR T Q f t 7 
FORM 5 
DEPARTMENT: D»ta Processing 
1 
2 
3 
4 
i, 
1. 
; 
8. 
9. 
11. 
Description 
Permanent Saltries 
Temporary Salaries 
Employe* Benefits 
Public Notices 
Travel 
V f | « . | 
Postage 
Equipment Supplies and Maintenance 
Telephone 
Professional and Technical 
Equipment Lease 
Equipment Purchase 
Miscellaneous Supplies 
Miscellaneous Services 
(Coonission, Asstttor, Treasurer, Auditor, 
Rtcordtr, Attorntj Dt11 Proc•ss i ng, t t c , ) 
Actual 
$ 
$ _ 
$ _ 
Eipenses 
•..,-.,„ 
1^ 5 ,000 
— -
.00 
24. 
TOTAL I 5,000.00 
GARPIBLD 
COONTT FORM 7 
HEHORANDUH BUDGET 
SOHKABT 
INDIRECT COST ALLOCATIONS OF ASSESSING AND COLLBaiNG PROPERTY TUBS 
FOB CALENDAR YBAR 1 9 8 7 
Ptrcent of Tottl 
11 
Description 
Ot i l i t i t s 
Inturtnct 
Htinttntnct/Custoditl 
Ptrsonntl 
T ^ T A U 
) . 
Actual Expenses 
k i f i .nnnnn 
S 1,200.00 
S 5 .600.00 
< X 17.892.00 
* \ 8.027TQp 
t 4 a, -71 <7ffi f^^^^ 
Count?-•wide Cott 
1 
t 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
1 
1 
I 
\ 
X 
X 
X 
X 
TOTAL t 14,128.51 29 M,X 
NOTB: While tbt aotbod of allocating indirect cost it not defined htrt, tucb 
•ethods ibould bo dtfinod by tbt county utint tbo aott reatontblt 
cotnon donotiinttor tucb tt nuabtr of eaployeet for portonnol, square 
foottit for utilititt, ttc. Tbttt ctleulttiont trt not required to bt 
tubaltted but autt bt doeuaented for tudit purpottt. 
Exhibit E 
KINGHORN, P E T E R S , P R O B S T & SLOAN 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
9 EXCHANGE PLACE. SUITE 1000 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8 4 1 1 1 
;RALD H. K I N G H O R N . P.C. 
LL T H O M A S P E T E R S 
LEGORY L. P R O B S T 
*RY E L L E N S L O A N 
AX ASSOCIATION OF 
INDIVIDUAL PRACTITIO>TKIlS 
TELEPHONE SOI 364-8644 
June 15, 1988 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr. William C. Vickery 
State Court Administrator 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
230 South 500 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: Letter of June 6, 19 8 8—Holme, Roberts and Owen— 
Consolidation of cases relating to costs of assessing and 
collecting Utah property taxes. 
Dear Mr, Vickery: 
As I advised Mr. Ron Gibson by telephone, I have been 
contacted by several of the 29 counties of Utah concerning 
representing them as special counsel with regard to the various 
actions filed in each of the counties challenging the separate 
statutory mill levy for assessing and collecting property taxes 
and specific refund actions for taxes paid under protest by 
numerous property owners within the various counties of the 
State of Utah. 
It was my understanding that you were advised that, in 
all likelihood, the counties would have no objection to con-
solidation. However, that is not accurate, and at this point in 
time each of the county attorneys that I have discussed the 
matter with is opposed to consolidation. 
While there is a common legal question, i.e. the 
constitutionality of the assessing and collecting statute, there 
are numerous factual issues which are county-specific and which 
require, in our judgment, resort to tax reccrds within each 
county, budget records within each county, assessment records 
within each county, and treasurers records within each county. 
To be specific, in each case there is an assertion 
concerning the amount it costs to assess and collect property 
taxes in each' specific county and how that compares to the 
specific amount of taxes paid by each taxpayer within that 
county. Further, I do not agree with the assertion in Mr. 
Denton's letter that the only persons who would be present as 
W i l l i a m U . v i u j s e i y 
June 15, 1988 
Page 2 
witnesses in the trial would be the State Auditor, State Trea-
surer and State Tax Commission. In my judgment the State's roll 
will be relatively passive. Indeed, I would anticipate that 
each County Assessor, each County Treasurer, each County Auditor 
and the County Commissioner's of each county who are the chief 
policy makers and establish and approve each county budget, 
would also be required to be present at trial. Since the tax 
payments that are being challenged were made to each specific 
county, those refund actions do indeed relate specifically to 
each such county. 
Additionally, the counties can be grouped into two 
general categories. There are some counties that are exporting 
counties and there are some counties that are importing 
counties. In short, some counties receive less than the amount 
that was raised by the separate mill levy, and there are some 
counties that receive more than is raised in their county by the 
mill levy. Therefore, to lump them all together with these 
factual differences does not make any sense. I would agree that 
ultimately the legal issue concerning the statute would be 
common to all of the cases. However, it would seem to me that 
which ever case moved forv/ard the quickest would be the one that 
would ultimately present the legal question to the judge for a 
decision. Obviously, once we receive a ruling out of one of the 
judges, the other cases could then be stayed pending the ulti-
mate determination by the Supreme Court; after which, depending 
upon the outcome, the case could then be dismissed or would have 
to be tried factually in each county where the property was 
assessed, the taxes were paid under protest, and the cause of 
action was filed. 
Certainly, it is not our intent to unduly burden the 
court system of this State, nor to compound the impact of 
litigation. However, we do feel at this point in time that 
consolidation would be premature and, therefore, we request that 
consolidation be denied at this time. 
Based upon the above and foregoing, and pursuant to 
Section 78-3-24(L), and in behalf of Tooele, Millard, Uintah, 
Iron, Cache, Emery, Grand, Sevier, Davis, Box Elder, Salt Lake, 
and Weber Counties, I do hereby object to the proposed con-
solidation of these cases at the present time. 
^ 
IOMAS PETERS 
Special Deputy County Attorney 
for the above-named Counties. 
hw 
cc: Holme, Roberts and Owen 
Appendix A 
17-19-15. Separate budget for costs of assessing, collect-
ing, and distributing property taxes — Submis-
sion to state auditor for review — Allowable costs 
established by rule — Transmission to tax com-
mission — Limitations on tax rate — Exceptions 
— Adjustments. 
(1) To promote appraisal and equalization of property values and effective 
collection and distribution of property tax proceeds, the county governing 
body of each county shall annually separately budget for all costs incurred in 
the assessment, collection, and distribution of property taxes and related ap-
praisal programs and submit those budgets to the state auditor for review. 
(2) The state auditor shall establish, by rule, categories of allowable costs 
and shall certify submitted budgets for compliance with approved categories. 
(3) Upon review and certification by the state auditor, the aggregated state-
wide costs shall be transmitted to the State Tax Commission for determina-
tion of a mandatory statewide tax rate sufficient to meet those expenditures. 
By June 8 of each year the tax commission shall certify the rate to each 
county auditor for inclusion upon the tax notice as a separately listed and 
identified local levy. 
(4) The tax rate may not exceed a maximum of .0005 per dollar of taxable 
value of taxable property except for: (a) mandated or formally adopted reap-
praisal programs conforming to tax commission rules; or (b) actions required 
to meet legislative, judicial, or administrative orders. Taxes levied for this 
purpose may not be included in determining the maximum allowable levy for 
the county or any other taxing district. 
(5) In the initial year that the levy adopted under this section is effective, 
each taxing district within counties which had not previously levied separate 
assessing, collecting, and distributing levies, shall reduce its property tax levy 
by an amount equal to that paid by the taxing district in the previous year for 
the cost of assessing, collecting, and distributing taxes. 
(6) Revenues received by each county from the levy authorized by this 
section in excess of the amount set out in the certified budget shall be trans-
mitted to the state treasurer for equalization and distribution to the counties 
in accordance with the certified budgets. Any revenue excess resulting from 
an increase in collection rates upon final settlement shall be deposited by the 
state treasurer in a trust account to be adjusted against subsequent years. 
History: C. 1953, 17-19-15, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 169, § 1; 1987, ch. 4, § 16; 1988, ch. 
3, § 67. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, in subsection 
(1 > substituted "county governing body" for 
"board of county commissioners" and in subsec-
tion (3) in the second sentence substituted 
"June 8" for "June 1." 
The 1988 amendment, effective February 9, 
1988, substituted "per dollar of taxable value 
of taxable property" for "of assessed valuation" 
near the beginning in Subsection (4) and made 
two minor stylistic changes in Subsection (1). 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 4, § 307 provides that this section has ret-
rospective operation to January 1, 1987. 
Laws 1988, ch. 3, § 269 provides that the act 
"has retrospective operation to January 1, 
1988." 
Cited in Boards of Educ. v. Salt Lake 
County Comm'n, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (1988). 
